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1.0 SCOPE 
1.1 General. This part of this specification establishes the 
requirements for performance, design and verification of one type 
of equipment identified as the Space Shuttle Block I1 Solid 
Rocket Motor CPW1-1900. 
provide the propulsion for the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) of the 
Space Transportation System (STS) for the Eastern Test Range 
(ETR) and Western Test Range (WTR). This CEI requires 
interfacing with the SRB. 
This Contract End Item (CEI) is used to 
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
The following documents, of the exact issue shown, form a part of 
this specification to the extent specified herein. Current issue 
is shown for some documents in place of specific date and issue 
when the document is under CCB control. 
applicable documents in Sections 3, 4 ,  and 5 will be by the basic 
number. 
Reference to all 
2.1 Specifications. 
Military 
MIL-D-1000, March 1, 1985 
Drawings, Engineering and Associated Lists 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.1.3, 3.3.1.3.1, 
3.3.1.3.2, 3.3.1.3.4, 3.3.1.3.6 
MIL-B-5087B(2) , August, 31, 1970 
Bonding, Electrical, and Lightning Protection for 
Aerospace Systems 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.6, 3.3.5.2 
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MIL-W-6858C, October 20, 1964 
Interim Amendment 1 (USAF), June 1965 
Welding, Resistance, Aluminum, Magnesium, Non- 
Hardening Steels or Alloys, Nickel Alloys, Heat-- 
Resisting Alloys, and Titanium Alloys, Spot and 
Seam 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.6 
MIL-I-6866B(2), January 30, 1969 
Inspection, Penetrant Method of 
Applicable Paragraphs: 4.1.1.1.3 
MIL-I-6870C, March 27, 1973 
Inspection Program Requirements, Nondestructive 
Testing for Aircraft and Missile Materials and 
Parts 
Applicable Paragraphs: 4.1.1.1.3 
MIL-S-7742B, Amendment 1, March 15, 1973 
Screw Threads, Standard, Optimum Selected Series, 
General Specification for 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.9 
MIL-B-7883B, February 20, 1968 
Brazing of Steels, Copper, Copper Alloys, Nickel 
Alloys, Aluminum and Aluminum Alloys 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.7 
MIL-S-8879A, Notice 2, March 15, 1973 
Screw Threads, Controlled Radius Root with 
Increased Minor Diameter, General specification 
for 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.9 
8 
I 
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MIL-N-8922, 28 January 1972 
Nut, Self-locking, Steel, 220 KSI FTU, 450° F 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.10 
MIL-N-25027E, Amendment 3, 21 October 1985 
Nut, Self-locking, 250° F, 450° F, 800° F 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.10 
MIL-I-26860B, April 25, 1974 
Indicator, Humidity, Plug, Color Change 
applicable Paragraphs: 5.2.2 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
JSC 07636C, August 1, 1984; Change Notice 11, October 
17, 1984 
Lightning Protection Criteria Document 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.5.2, 3.3.5.5 
JSC 07700, Vol. X, Revision D, Appendix 10.10, 
September 30, 1983 through Change No. 83, May 5, 1986 
Space Shuttle Flight and Ground System 
Specification, Level I1 Program Definition and 
Requirements 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.7.1 
JSC 07700, Vol. XII, Revision B, February 18, 1983 
Space Shuttle Program Integrated Logistics 
Requirements 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.4, 3.4.2 
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JSC 08060 (D), January 20, 1983 
Space Shuttle System Pyrotechnic Specification 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.4.12, 3.2.1.4.12.1, 
3.2.1.5.1, 3.3.6.10, 4.1, 5.3 
JSC 08800A, November 1974 
JSC Supplement to NHB 5300.4 (3A) , ItRequirements 
for Soldered Electrical Connectionsll 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.6, 3.3.5.3 
JSC 09084, October 1974 
Coordinate Systems for the Space Shuttle Program 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.10 
JSC 20007, November 16, 1984 
Space Shuttle Lightning Protection Verification 
Document 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.5.5 
JSC-SL-E-0001, June 4, 1973 
Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirement, Systems 
for the Space Shuttle Program 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.6, 3.3.5.1 
JSC-SL-E-O002A, September 16, 1974 through Change No. 
12, March 10, 1986 
Specifications, Electromagnetic Interference 
Characteristics, Requirements for Equipment for 
the Space Shuttle Program 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.6, 3.3.5.1 
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JSC-SE-R-0006AI April 2, 1973 
Materials and Processes, NASA JSC Requirements for 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.9.2, 10.1 
JSC-,SE-S-007 3B , February 1975 
Space Shuttle Fluid Procurement and Use Control 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.9 
JSC-SN-.?-0005, March 1974 
Specification Contamination Control Requirements 
for the Space Shuttle Program 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.9 
MSFC-SPEC-250(1) , February 28, 1963 
Frotective Finishes for Space Vehicles, Structures 
and Associated Flight Equipment 
Applicable Paragraphs : 3.3.8.2 
MSFC-SPEC-445, May 1965 
Adhesive Bonding, Process Inspection, Requirements 
for 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.8, 10.1 
MSFC-SPEC-504AI November 1977 
delding, Aluminum, Aluminum Alloys 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.6, 4.1.1.1.3 
MSFC-SPEC-522A, November 18, 1977 
%sign Criteria for Controlling Stress Corrosion 
Cracking 
ApsPicable Paragraphs: 3.3.8.2 
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Morton Thiokol , Inc. 
CPW1-3300 (Current Issue) 
2.2 Standards. 
Military 
MIL-STD-100A, October 1, 1967 
Engineering Drawing Practices 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.1.3, 3.3.1.3.6 
MIL-STD-l05D, Change 2, March 20, 1964 
Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by 
Attributes 
Applicable Paragraphs: 4.1.1.1.4 
MIL-STD-129F (l), May 20, 1974 
Performance, Design and Verification Requirements, 
Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Lightweight 
CPW1-3300 for Space Shuttle High Performance Solid 
Rocket Motor Project Operational Flight 
Applicable Paragraphs: 4.2.1 
I ECW3-3404 (Current Issue) Engineering Critical Component Specification Part 
I of Two Parts; Performance, Design and Verification 
Requirements for Space Shuttle Systems Tunnel 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.10 
Marking for Shipment and Storage 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.12, 5.2.6 
I MIL-STD-130F (1) , July 2, 1984 
Identification andMarking 0fU.S. Military Property 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.12 
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MIL-STD-l43B, November 12, 1969 
Standards and Specifications, Order of Precedence 
for the Selection of 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.1 
MIL-STD-280A, July 7, 1969 
Definitions of Item Levels, Item Exchangeability, 
Models, and Related Terms 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.11 
MIL-STD-414, Change 1, May 8, 1968 
Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by 
Variables for  Percent Defective 
Applicable Paragraphs: 4.1.1.1.4 
MIL-STD-453, Change 1, September 4, 1963 
Inspection, Radiographic 
Applicable Paragraphs: 4.1.1.1.3 
MIL-STD-454D, August 31, 1973 
Standard General Requirements for Electronic 
Equipment 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.8.1 
MIL-STD-462, Notice 1, August 1, 1968, Notice 2, May 1, 
1970 
Measurement of Electromagnetic Interference 
Characteristics 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.6, 3.3.5.1 
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MIL-STD-463, June 9, 1966 
Definitions and System of Units, Electromagnetic 
Interference Technology 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.5.1 
MIL-STD-681B, February 6, 1967 
Identification Coding and Application of Hookup and 
Lead Wire 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.12 
MIL-STD-794D, Notice 2, December 18, 1975 
Parts and Equipment, Procedures for Packaging and 
Packing of 
Applicable Paragraphs: 5.2 
MIL-STD-810C, March 10, 1975 
Environmental Test Methods 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.8.1 
MIL-STD-l246A, August 18, 1967 
Product Cleanliness Levels and Contamination Control 
Program 
Applicable Paragraphs: 5.2.4 
MIL-STD-l472B, December 31, 1974 
Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military 
Systems, Equipment, and Facilities 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.14 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
MSFC-STD-136, June 11, 1971 
Parts Mounting Design Categories for Soldered Printed 
Wiring Board Assemblies 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.5.4 
MSFC-STD-l54A, December 15, 1965 
Printed Wiring Boards, (Copper Clad) Design, 
Documentation and Fabrication of 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.5.4 
MSFC-STD-349A, October 29, 1965 
Amendment 1, July 16, 1968 
Electrical and Electronic Reference Designations 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.6 
JSCM 8080, Change 6 ,  7, and 8, December 1, 1977 (as 
changed by Approved Deviation DAR SRM0005 and standard 
133B requirements are not applicable) 
Manned Spacecraft Criteria and Standards 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.6.1.1, 3.2.1.6.1.2, 
3.3.2.1, 5.3, 10.1 
2.3 Handbooks. 
Military 
MIL-HDBK-5B, September 1, 1971 
Metallic Materials and Elements for Aerospace Vehicle 
Structures 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.2 
MIL-HDBK-l7A, January 19, 1971 
Plastics for Flight Vehicles 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.2 
Specification No. CPW1-1900 
25 November 1986 
Page 1-10 
MIL-HDBK-23A(l), December 30, 1968 
Structural Sandwich Composites 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.2 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NHB 1440.4A, July 19, 1968 
Specifications and Standards for NASA Engineering 
Data Micro Reproduction System 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.1.3.3 
NHB 5300.4 (1D-2) , October 1979 
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality 
Provisions for the Space Shuttle Program 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.3, 3.2.6, 4.1.1.1 
NHB 5300.4(3A), May 1968 
Requirements for Soldered Electrical Connectors 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.6, 3.3.5.3 
NHB 5300.4(3G), April 1985 
Requirements for Interconneting Cables, Harnesses, 
and Wiring 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.5.6 
NHB 5300.4(3H), May 1984 
Requirements for Crimping and Wire Wrap 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.6 
Specification No. CPW1-1900 
25 November 1986 
Page 1-11 
NHB 6000.1C, July 1976 
Requirements for Packaging, Handling, and 
Transportation for Aeronautical and Space Systems, 
Equipment and Associated Components 
Applicable Paragraphs: 5.2, 5.2.5, 10.1 
NHB 8060.1A, February 1974 
Flammability, Odor and Offgassing Requirements and 
Test Procedures for Materials in Environments That 
Support Combustion 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.8.3 
MSFC-HDBK-505A, January 1981 
Structural Strength Program Requirements 
2.4 Publications. 
Military 
AMCR 385-100, August 1, 1985 
Army Material Command Regulation Safety Manual 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.6.4 
DOD 4145.26M, March 1986 
DOD Contractor's Safety Manual for Ammunition, 
Explosives, and Related Dangerous Materials 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.6.4 
AFM 71-4, August 9, 1971 
Packaging and Handling of Dangerous Materials for 
Transportation by Military Aircraft 
Applicable Paragraphs: 5.3 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
MMI 1700.17, June 4, 1982 
MSFC Procedure for Acquiring Permits to Ship Rocket 
Motors Containing Class B Explosives in a Propulsive 
State Or With Igniters Installed 
Applicable Paragraphs: 5.2 
CM-017-016-2H, (Current Issue) 
Interface Control Documentation Contractual Index 
and Status Report, Space Shuttle Projects 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.1.4 
ICD-2-00001, (Current Issue) 
Shuttle Vehicle Mold Lines and Protuberances 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.6.2, Figure 4 
ICD-2-OA001, (Current Issue) 
Shuttle System/Launch Platform Stacking and VAB 
Servicing 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.1.3.1, 3.6.2 
ICD-2-OA002, (Current Issue) 
Space Shuttle Launch Pad and Platform 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.1.3.1, 3.6.2 
ICD-2-4A001, (Current Issue) 
SolidRocket BoosterReceivingandProcessing Station 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.1.3.1, 3.6.2 
ICD-2-4A002, (Current Issue) 
Solid Rocket Booster Retrieval Station 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.1.3.1, 3.2.1.4.10, 
3.2.1.4.12.2, 3.6.2 
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ICD 3-44001, (Current issue) 
Solid Rocket Motor to Forward Skirt 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.3, 3.2.7.2, 3.6.2, 
Figure 4 
ICD 3-44003, (Current Issue) 
Solid Rocket Motor to Aft Skirt and Thrust Vector 
Control Actuator 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.3, 3.2.1.4.1, 
3.2.1.4.4, 3.2.1.4.8, 3.2.1.4.9, 3.2.1.4.12, 
3.2.1.4.12.3, 3.2.7.2, 3.6.2, Figure 4 
ICD 3-44004, (Current Issue) 
Solid Rocket Motor to ET Attach Ring 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.3, 3.2.7.2, 3.6.2, 
Figure 4 
ICD 3-44005, (Current Issue) 
Solid Rocket Motor to Solid Rocket Booster Electrical 
and Instrumentation Subsystem 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.4.4, 3.2.1.4.12.1, 
3.2.1.4.12.4, 3.2.1.5, 3.2.1.5.2, 3.2.1.6, 
3.2.1.6.1.2, 3.2.1.6.1.3, 3.2.1.6.2, 3.2.1.6.2.1, 
3.2.1.6.2.2, 3.3.5.1, 3.3.5.5, 3.6.2 
ICD 3-44008, (Current Issue) 
Systems Tunnel to SRB Systems 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.3, 3.2.1.6, 3.2.1.10.2, 
3.2.1.11, 3.2.7.2, 3.6.2 
SE-019-019-2H(B) , May 19, 1978 
Shuttle Master Verification Plan, Vol. IV, Solid 
Rocket Booster Verification Plan 
Applicable Paragraphs: 4.1 
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SE-019-043-2Ht May 20 ,  1 9 7 5  
SCN 01, S e p t e m b e r  24 ,  1 9 8 2  
Natura l  Environments f o r  t he  S p a c e  S h u t t l e  S o l i d  
R o c k e t  Motor Booster 
Applicable  P a r a g r a p h s :  3 . 2 . 7 . 1  
SE-019-049-2H(A) , December 1 7  , 1976  
SCN 1 3 ,  F e b r u a r y  2 ,  1977 
SCN 1 4 ,  March 9 ,  1977 
SCN 15, May 2 5 ,  1977 
SCN 1 6 ,  June 3 ,  1977 
SCN 1 7 ,  Ju ly  12, 1977 
SCN 18,  August 10, 1977 
SCN 20 ,  October 2 0 ,  1977 
SCN 21,  October 2 0 ,  1977 
SCN 22 ,  October 20 ,  1977 
SCN 23,  October 27 ,  1977 
SCN 24 ,  October 2 7 ,  1977 
SCN 25,  January 9 ,  1978 
SCN 26,  March 15, 1978  
SCN 27,  A p r i l  3 ,  1978  
SCN 2 8 ,  May 15, 1978  
SCN 29 ,  June 2 2 ,  1978  
SCN 3 0 ,  August 1 4 ,  1978 
SCN 31,  October 10, 1979  
SCN 32,  A p r i l  9 ,  1979 
SCN 33 ,  J u l y  1 2 ,  1979  
SCN 34 ,  A p r i l  1 0 ,  1980  
SCN 35,  August 1 2 ,  1980  
SCN 3 6 ,  S e p t e m b e r  2 6 ,  1980  
SCN 37,  March 26 ,  1 9 8 1  
SCN 38,  J u l y  15, 1 9 8 1  
SCN 39,  May 2 6 ,  1982 
SCN 40,  J u l y  2 ,  1982 
SCN 4 1 ,  J u l y  23 ,  1982 
SCN 42 ,  October 15, 1982 
SCN 43,  January 1 7 ,  1 9 8 3  
SCN 44,  January 7 ,  1 9 8 3  
SCN 4 7 ,  F e b r u a r y  6 ,  1984 
Vibra t ion ,  Acoust ic  and Shock  Design and T e s t  
C r i t e r i a  
Applicable P a r a g r a p h s :  3 .2 .7 .2 ,  4 . 1  
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SE-019-053-2H(E), January 1986  
SRB Re-entry Therma l  Environment Data Book 
Applicable P a r a g r a p h s :  3 .2 .7 .2  
SE-019-057-2H(B), November 1 6 ,  1 9 7 8  
SCN 033, F e b r u a r y  23 ,  1979 
SCN 034,  March 1, 1979  
SCN 036,  A p r i l  1 2 ,  1979 
SCN 037,  June 11, 1979 
SCN 039,  August 27, 1979 
SCN 042,  January 11, 1980  
SCN 043,  March 7 ,  1980  
SCN 046 ,  August 8, 1980  
SCN 047,  Sep tember  2 5 ,  1980  
SCN 049,  January 8 ,  1982 
SCN 060, August 9 ,  1984 
SCN 062,  May 1, 1985 
S p a c e  S h u t t l e  SRB Design Loads ,  Book 1 
Applicable P a r a g r a p h s :  3 . 2 . 7 . 2  
SE-019-057-2H(F), S e p t e m b e r  1 7 ,  1 9 7 6  
SCN 014,  November 30 ,  1976  
SCN 017,  F e b r u a r y  2 2 ,  1977 
SCN 019,  June 1 3 ,  1 9 7 7  
SCN 020,  J u l y  25 ,  1 9 7 7  
SCN 022,  November 1 0 ,  1977  
SCN 023,  November 2 9 ,  1977  
SCN 025,  March 2 7 ,  1 9 7 8  
SCN 026,  A p r i l  11, 1 9 7 8  
SCN 027,  May 1, 1978 
SCN 029,  September  21 ,  1978  
SCN 030,  October 2 5 ,  1978  
SCN 031,  January 2 2 ,  1979 
SCN 032,  F e b r u a r y  23 ,  1979 
SCN 035,  A p r i l  9 ,  1979  
SCN 038,  June 18, 1979  
SCN 040,  September  28 ,  1979 
SCN 041,  January 11, 1980  
SCN 044,  A p r i l  25, 1980  
SCN 045,  June 25 ,  1 9 8 0  
SCN 048,  January 8 ,  1982 
SCN 050, May 2 6 ,  1982 
SCN 051,  June 1 4 ,  1982  
SCN 052,  August 24, 1982 
SCN 053,  November 1 9 ,  1982 
SCN 054, 
SCN 055, 
SCN 057, 
SCN 058, 
SCN 059, 
SCN 061, 
SCN 063, 
SCN 064, 
SCN 065, 
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February 6, 1984 
February 6, 1984 
April 12, 1984 
June 7, 1984 
June 21, 1984 
August 23, 1984 
May 1, 1985 
November 1, 1985 
April 9, 1986 
Space Shuttle SRB Design Loads, Book 2 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.7.2, 10.1 
SE-019-058-2H(A), March 23, 1977 
SRB Contamination Control Plan (Paragraphs 7.1.3 
and 7.1.4 only) 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.9 
SE-019-067-2H, December 16, 1975 
SCN 001, January 10, 1977 
SCN 002, June 26, 1981 
SCN 004, January 14, 1977 
SCN 010, April 26, 1977 
SRB Component Environmental Test Requirements and 
Methods 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.7.2 
SE-019-094-2H(A), March 1978 (as modified by S/A 
No. 237) 
SCN 001, March 1983 
Material Selection List and Use Instructions 
SRM/SRB 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.1.1 
MM8040.12(A), July 2, 1976 
Standard Contractor Configuration Management 
Requirements MSFC 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.1.4 
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American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
ASME Code Section V I I I ,  1974 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 
Applicable Paragraphs: 4.1 
American Society for Testing and Materials 
ASTM E 399-74 
Plane Strain Fracture Toughness of Metallic 
Materials 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.2 
Other Agencies 
CFR 49, Parts 100-177, December 1, 1980 
Code of Federal Regulations - Transportation 
Applicable Paragraphs : 5.3 
Rockwell International, Space Division 
SD73-SH-0181-3Af September 1978 
Change No. 1, March 12, 1979 
Change No. 2, May 8, 1979 
Change No. 3, September 26, 1980 
Change No. 4, October 20, 1980 
Space Shuttle Aerodynamics Heating Data Book, Shuttle 
Vehicle Booster-Ascent, Volume I11 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.7.2 
SD74-SH-0144Df December 1977 
Change No. 1, September 22, 1978 
Change No. 2, May 12, 1978 
Change No. 3, March 28, 1980 
Change No. 4, April 23, 1982 
Change No. 5, October 29, 1982 
Space Shuttle Program Thermal Interface Design 
Data Book 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.7.2 
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Project Plans 
TWR-10184At January 10, 1975 (CD) 
Fracture Control Plan 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.2 
TWR-10192Ct December 1976 (CD) 
Material Selection and Control Plan for Space Shuttle 
SRM Project 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.9.2, 3.3.1.1, 3.3.8.3 
TBD 
8 Fracture Control Plan for Space Shuttle Block I1 SRM 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.2 
TBD 
1 Fracture Control Plan for the Space Shuttle Block I1 SRM 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.2 
Documents 
DPD 400A, September 11, 1975 
Information Requirements Document 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.1.4, 3.3.1.3.5, 3.3.1.3.6, 
4.4.3, 5.2.3 
3 
TWR-10195, (Current Issue) l 
GFE/GFP Requirements for the Space Shuttle Solid 
Rocket Motor 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.1.6 
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TBD 
Block I1 SRM Motor Internal Insulation Design and 
Evaluation Requirements 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.1.3 
2.5 Drawings. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
MSFC-DWG-10A00516, September 23, 1977 
SRM Alignment Criteria 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.5.1 
MSFC-DWG-llA00950H, March 22, 1984 
Paint Pattern-SRB 
Applicable Paragraph: 3.1.3.1 
MSFC-DWG-85M03936A-3, March 1973 
EEE Parts Selection and Application Guidelines 2c. 
the Space Shuttle External Tank and Solid Rocket 
Booster 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.2.1.6, 3.3.1.2.1 
MSFC-DWG-10509308, EO-1 (January 1967), June 1960 
Welding Carbon Low Alloy Stainless Steel 
Applicable Paragraphs: 3.3.6.6 
3.0 REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 Definition. The Contract End Item ( C E I )  is defined in tern;,.:, 
of its function, major components, missions and operational 
concepts. 
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3.1.1 General Description. The SRM CEI is used as a major sub- 
system of a solid rocket booster for the Shuttle Vehicle. The 
Shuttle Vehicle Booster will consist of two Solid Rocket Boosters 
(SRBs), each of which will utilize one CPW1-1900 SRM. The two 
SRMs will operate in parallel with the Space Shuttle Main Engines 
and will provide impulse and enable thrust vector control to propel 
and control the Space Shuttle Vehicle from liftoff to SRB staging. 
The SRM will consist of a lined, insulated, segmented metal rocket 
motor case loaded with solid propellant; an ignition system complete 
with electromechanical safe and arm device (StA), initiators, and 
igniter assembly; moveable nozzle; exit cone with a linear shaped 
charge for severance and a nozzle plug; instrumentation; and 
integration hardware including electrical brackets, systems tunnel, 
grounding provisions, stiffener rings, and attachment provisions 
to the forward and aft SRB skirts and the SRB/ET attach ring. 
3.1.2 Missions. Flight hardware and ground systems requirements 
will be based on providing SRMs for operational flights. 
3.1.3 Operational Concepts. The SRM design requirements have 
been based on the following operational concepts: 
3.1.3.1 Assembly Operations Concept. The SRM will be delivered 
to the launch site in motor segments and subassemblies which are 
as large as practical. The S&A device with initiators installed 
will be shipped to the launch site as an assembly separate from 
the SRM. 
Morton Thiokol's production facility to the maximum extent 
feasible. To comply with the assembly operations concept, the 
SRM will meet those interface requirements of ICD 2-OA001, ICD 
2-OA002, and ICD 2-4A001 which affect SRM interface with the 
Receiving Station, the Vehicle Assembly Building (ETR only), the 
Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP) (ETR only), and the Launch Pad. 
The SRM forward rocket motor segment, center rocket motor segments, 
aft rocket motor segment, nozzle extension, and integration hard- 
ware will be inspected and stored vertically or horizontally either 
outdoors (with protection as required) or indoors; or further 
assembled vertically in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) (ETR) 
or on the Launch Pad (WTR). The aft booster assembly, forward 
booster assembly, and center segnents will be stacked on the MLP 
(ETR) or Launch Pad (WTR). Stacking of the assemblies and seg- 
ments will include installation of the pin retainer assembly fol- 
lowing satisfactory leak checks of all case joints to verify proper 
Preassembly and checkout will have been accomplished at 
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assembly. The joint paint pattern shall meet the requirements of 
MSFC-DWG-llA00950 (ETR) or ICD 2-4AOO2 (WTR). The S&A device 
will be installed on the SRM and then the seal between the S&A 
device and the igniter will be leak checked. System verification 
checks will be accomplished through the Launch Processing System 
(LPS) at various points. 
3.1.3.2 Launch Pad Operations Concept. The SRM will be verified 
ready for launch in the VAB prior to pad rollout (ETR) or on the 
launch pad (WTR). Final system readiness checks will be conducted 
on the launch pad. 
3.1.3.3 Booster Operations Concept. During the boost phase of 
flight, the two SRMs will operate in parallel with the Space Shuttle 
Main Engines (SSME). The SRB will provide impulse and thrust 
vector control while functioning in parallel with the SSME from 
lift-off to SRB separation. 
3.1.3.4 Recovery Concepts. Upon separation from the external 
tank (ET), the SRBs will initially decelerate by inherent 
aerodynamic drag forces. An active deceleration system will be 
provided by each SRB to reduce the velocity before water entry. 
A portion of the nozzle exit cone of each nozzle will be separated 
to reduce the impact loads imparted to the nozzle assembly, 
actuators, and case. The SRB will be dewatered with the SRB 
dewatering system and then towed back to the dock to begin 
refurbishment. 
3.1.3.4.1 Refurbishment Concepts. The SRM will be cleansed and 
disassembled into the following components: (a) casting segments, 
(b) S&A device, (c) nozzle exit cone extension, and (d) stiffener 
rings. The remaining portion of the nozzle exit cone extension 
will be removed from the nozzle forward assembly at the field 
joint. The igniter and nozzle shall be capable of removal to 
allow inspection of the igniter to case and the nozzle to case 
seals. The joint areas will be protected during the transportation 
and refurbishment operations. All other SRM components will be 
prepared for shipment and shipped to the factory where they will 
be refurbished and remanufactured for reuse. 
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3.1.4 Organizational and Management Relationships. The Systems 
Requirements Section is responsible for the preparation and 
maintenance of Part I of this specification. The Systems Management 
Manager of the SRM Project/Program office is responsible for the 
control of this specification. This specification is prepared in 
accordance with the requirements of NAS8-37296, the Information 
Requirements Document (IRD), and MM8040.12, Standard Contractor 
Configuration Management Requirements, MSFC Programs, and will be 
controlled to the level shown in the specification tree referenced 
in Paragraph 3.1.5. All changes to this specification will be 
processed in accordance with the requirements of MM8040.12. In 
the event of conflict between requirements referenced and the 
content of this specification, the order of precedence will be as 
follows : 
1) This document. 
2) All other applicable specifications and standards. 
3) MSFC SE-prefix document loads take precedence over derived 
Interface Control Document identified loads. 
The current status of Interface Control Documents (ICDs) may be 
determined from CM-017-016-2H. 
3.1.5 Systems Engineering Requirements. The relationship of the 
Space Shuttle Contract End Item (CEI) Specification to other Shuttle 
Program and Space Shuttle Project Systems Engineering documentation 
is presented in the Integrated Logistics Support Plan. The 
components covered by this specification appear on the specification 
tree. 
3.1.6 Government Furnished Property List. The Government Furnished 
Equipment (GFE) is identified in TWR-10195, GFE/GFP Requirements 
for the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor. 
3.1.7 Critical Components. This paragraph is not applicable to 
this specification. 
3.2 Characteristics. The SRM shall burn continuously as the 
propulsive element in each of two SRBs in parallel with the Space 
Shuttle Main Engines to provide impulse to propel the flight vehicle 
and enable thrust vector control from ignition to SRB staging. 
The thrust and impulse characteristics of each SRM are specified 
relative to the nozzle centerline. 
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3.2.1 Performance. The SRM shall function from sea level to 
200,000 feet over a motor propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) 
(see 6.1.1) range of +40 to +90° F during and after the motor has 
been exposed to the thermal environments of 3.2.7. SRM performance 
requirements shall be based on a PMBT of +60° F. 
performance limits and tolerances shall apply to the qualification 
configuration and to all deliverable flight SRMs. 
The specified 
3.2.1.1 General Performance, The propulsion system shall conform 
to the following performance characteristics. 
3.2.1.1.1 Ignition Characteristics. The following ignition 
characteristics shall be applicable to an SRM over a PMBT range 
of +40 to +90° F during the ignition transient. 
3.2.1.1.1.1 Ignition Interval. The ignition interval shall be 
between 170 and 3 4 0  milliseconds after ignition command to the 
initiators in the S&A device up to a point at which the head-end 
chamber pressure has built up to 563.5 psia. 
3.2.1.1.1.2 Pressure Rise Rate. The maximum rate of pressure 
buildup shall be 109 psi f o r  any 10 millisecond interval. 
3.2.1.1.2 Motor Characteristics. The SRM shall meet the following 
performance characteristics. 
3.2.1.1.2.1 Nominal Thrust-Time Curve. The nominal (see 6.1.1) 
vacuum thrust-time data for the SRM is tabulated in Table I. 
A l s o  tabulated are upper and lower bounds about the nominal curve 
that represent the population range expected to encompass the 
nominal thrust-time trace using all appropriate SRM flight motors 
when corrected to the target burn rate at a PMBT of 60° F. 
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3.2.1.1.2.2 Performance Tolerances and Limits. The nominal value, 
tolerance, and limits for selected performance parameters are 
tabulated in Table I1 for individual flight motors. The delivered 
performance values for each individual motor when corrected to a 
60° F PMBT shall not exceed the limits specified for any performance 
parameter in Table 11. The PMBT used in the performance calculation 
for each motor will be based on air temperature measurements taken 
at the launch pad. Maximum matched pair performance difference 
values for applicable parameters are also tabulated in Table I1 
for matched pairs of motors. The difference for each parameter 
for a matched pair shall be determined by dividing the absolute 
value of the difference by the arithmetic mean value of the pair. 
These values expressed in terms of percent for each matched pair 
shall not exceed the maximum differences specified in Table 11. 
The differentials for matched pairs are applicable throughout the 
PMBT range of 4 0  to 90° F assuming a maximum PMBT difference of 
1.4O F between motors of a flight set. 
is based on calculations using prelaunch meteorological data taken 
at the launch pad and is not verified by motor case temperature 
measurements. 
The maximum PMBT difference 
3.2.1.1.2.3 Thrust Differential. With a maximum PMBT difference 
of 1.4O F between the two SRMs on a Shuttle Vehicle, the 
differential thrust between the two SRMs shall not be greater than 
the values given in Table I11 at any time during the periods shown. 
These differentials are applicable over PMBT range of 40 to 90° F. 
3.2.1.2 Pressure Seals. The design and performance of the pressure 
seals used in the SRM shall be in accordance with the following 
requirements. 
a. Redundant, verifiable seals shall be provided for each 
pressure vessel leak path except for the flex bearing. 
b. Sealing shall accommodate case rounding, axial elongation, 
clevis/tang relative motion, nozzle rotation, and any 
other structural deflections which may occur. This 
shall apply for the actual as-built dimensions of each 
joint (all components) at mating. Sealing shall not 
require, but shall accommodate, pressure assistance. 
c. Seals shall provide zero leakage (no evidence of blowby 
or erosion) under worst case flight environment. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g* 
h. 
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Seals shall be capable of operating within a temperature 
range resulting from all natural and induced environments 
specified in paragraph 3.2.7 and all manufacturing 
processes. 
No single undetectable failure mode shall result in the 
loss of joint sealing capability. 
All leak paths shall remain sealed at both primary and 
secondary seals at all times, i.e., from the final leak 
test through the entire ignition pressure transient and 
the motor burn without evidence of blow-by or erosion. 
The verification process must not degrade the performance 
or integrity of the system. 
O-ring seal design shall be consistent with the following 
parameters: 
Min ( % )  Max(%) Gland Surface Finish (Microinches) 
Saueeze Saueeze Fill ( % I  Top Bottom Sides 
Bore seals lO(1) 35 - < 90 32 32 63 
Face seals lO(1) 35 - < 95 32 32 63 
(1) Minimum squeeze shall be lo%, including effects of 
Where additional standards are required, consensus seal 
industry standards shall be used for sizing seals and seal 
glands, determining tolerances and establishing required 
surface finishes. 
temperature, compression set, and pressure effects. 
3.2.1.2.1 Field Joints, Nozzle to Case Joints and Nozzle Internal 
Seals. 
a. Failure of the primary seal shall not result in failure 
of the secondary seal (s) . 
b. Both the primary and redundant seals shall provide 
independent sealing capability without evidence of blow- 
by or erosion. 
c. A minimum of two seals for each leak path shall be 
verifiable after all ground environments which could 
affect seal performance have been experienced. 
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d. 
e. Each seal shall maintain a sealing margin of 100% (based 
Bore seals must be verifiable in the proper sealing 
direction. 
on seal/metal tracking velocities) without pressure 
assistance, including the effects of manufacturing 
tolerances, pernanent joint deformations, natural and 
induced environment, and changes in geometry during 
motor burn. 
3.2.1.2.2 Flex Bearing Sealing. The flex bearing shall maintain 
a positive gas seal between its internal components. 
3.2.1.3 Case. The case shall function as an integral part of 
the combustion chamber in accordance with the following 
requirements: 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
When performing as part of the combustion chamber, the 
case shall be capable of containing the internal MEOP. 
The structural integrity of the pressurized portion of 
the case segments shall be demonstrated and verified 
prior to each use. Verification shall include a proof 
pressure test. In local areas where proof pressure 
tests are inadequate to reach the required stress level, 
inspection and fracture mechanics analysis shall be 
used to verify structural integrity. 
The case shall contain risers for attaching the ET/SRB 
aft attach ring as defined in ICD 3-44004. The risers 
shall be part of the pressurized section of the case 
and shall not degrade the integrity of the case. 
The case shall meet the SRB forward and aft skirt 
interfaces as defined in ICD 3-44001 and ICD 3-44003. 
The case shall have SRB systems tunnel components and 
electrical grounding straps bonded to it as specified in 
Paragraph 3.2.1.6.b and ICD 3-44008. 
The case segment mating joints shall incorporate 
provisions to insure proper segment orientation and 
alignment to facilitate joining, stacking, disassembly, 
and refurbishment for reuse. 
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g. The case segment mating joints shall not permit entry 
of external moisture when exposed to the natural 
environment of paragraph 3.2.7. 
h. The forward and aft segments of the case shall have 
ports for the installation of the ignition system and 
the nozzle assembly respectively. 
i. The case cylindrical segments shall be designed using 
biaxial improvement in the analysis. 
j. The case segments shall be designed using motor internal 
pressure drop from head end to aft end during motor 
operation in the analysis. 
loss  of strength or paint degradation when protected in 
accordance with paragraph 3.2.1.8. 
k. The case joints shall not experience chemical dissolution, 
3.2.1.4 Nozzle Assembly. 
3.2.1.4.1 Vectoring. The nozzle assembly shall be movable and 
be capable of omniaxial vectoring to a minimum of 8 degrees (may 
be reduced up to 0.5 degree for alignment error) from the nozzle 
null position at all aft end stagnation chamber pressures above 
75 psig. Vectoring in the retract direction shall be limited to 
-8 degrees (retract) at 75 psig aft end stagnation chamber pressure 
and decreased linearly to -3.5 degrees at 0 psig. Minimum nozzle 
gimbal rate and angular acceleration capability shall meet the 
requirements of ICD 3-44003. 
3.2.1.4.1.1 Actuator Stall Force. The nozzle assembly shall be 
capable of withstanding the loads induced by an actuator stall 
force of 103,424 pounds in the plane of the actuator. 
3.2.1.4.2 Geometric Thrust Vector. The geometric thrust vector 
shall not deviate from the limits illustrated in Figure 1 and 
stated below: 
a. Maximum radial displacement of the nozzle centerline 
relative to the SRM centerline shall not exceed 0.25 
inch. 
b. Maximum angular displacement of the nozzle centerline 
relative to the SRM centerline shall not exceed 0.50°. 
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3.2.1.4.3 Dynamic Thrust Vector. The dynamic thrust vector during 
firing from MEOP to 35 psia, shall not deviate from the limits 
illustrated in Figure 2, and stated below: 
a. Misalignment of the dynamic thrust vector with respect 
to the nozzle centerline, between null and 8 O ,  shall 
not deviate more than one degree. 
b. The radial offset between the dynamic thrust vector and 
nozzle centerline at the movable nozzle throat plane 
shall not exceed 1.13 inches. 
3.2.1.4.4 Exit Cone Severance. The nozzle assembly design shall 
provide a capability to jettison a portion of the exit cone assembly 
upon receipt of an electrical signal initiated from the SRB via a 
double shielded electrical cable. Provision for severing the aft 
exit cone shall be in accordance with ICD 3-44003 and ICD 3-44005. 
3.2.1.4.5 Nozzle Alignment. The nozzle alignment verification 
shall be possible prior to, or during assembly of the SRM. 
3.2.1.4.6 Flex Bearing Protection. The nozzle assembly shall 
incorporate a nozzle snubbing device suitable for preventing flex 
bearing damage resulting from water impact. This device shall 
limit the flex bearing axial travel to approximately one inch 
when the nozzle is in the null position and shall not adversely 
affect the nozzle assembly deflection capability. 
3.2.1.4.7 Environmental Protection. 
a. The nozzle assembly shall contain a covering and/or 
plug to protect the SRM from the environments specified 
in 3.2.7.1 during storage after assembly. 
b. The nozzle assembly shall contain a covering and/or 
plug to protect the SRM from the environments specified 
in 3.2.7.2 in the event of an on-pad SSME shutdown prior 
to SRB ignition. 
an overpressure of 1.0 pounds per square inch. The 
covering and/or plug shall be capable of being expelled 
without damaging any part of the shuttle system or 
adversely affecting the SRM performance. 
The covering and/or plug shall withstand 
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3.2.1.4.8 TVC Actuator Attach Points. The nozzle assembly shall 
have attach points for the government furnished TVC actuators and 
shall be compatible with the requirements defined in ICD 3-44003. 
3.2.1.4.9 Nozzle Assembly/Aft Segment Interface. The nozzle 
assembly without the exit cone assembly, shall be capable of being 
inserted into an assembled SRB aft skirt as defined in ICD 3-44003. 
3.2.1.4.10 Nozzle Assembly/Dewatering System Interface. The 
nozzle assembly shall be compatible with the SRB dewatering system 
in accordance with ICD 2-4A002. 
3.2.1.4.11 Flex Bearing. 
3.2.1.4.11.1 Total Deflection. The flex bearing shall be capable 
of providing a total deflection of 85O during each flight duty 
cycle. 
3.2.1.4.11.2 Bearing Torque Limits. The flex bearing torque at 
50 vector angle (using linear regression analysis of acceptance 
test sine wave event at 2 degrees and 7 degrees vector angles) 
shall not exceed the limitations shown in Figure 3. 
3.2.1.4.12 Aft Exit Cone Severance Ordnance Ring. The aft exit 
cone severance ordnance ring shall sever a portion of the nozzle 
exit cone. Severance shall be accomplished by using a detonator 
cartridge, and a Linear Shaped Charge (LSC) as defined in ICD 
3-44003. The LSC and its Electroexplosive Detonator shall meet 
the requirements of JSC 08060. Initiation of the LSC shall not 
damage the SRB aft thermal shield to the extent that it cannot 
perform its intended function. 
3.2.1.4.12.1 Detonator. The aft exit cone severance ordnance 
ring shall use one government furnished detonator cartridge as 
defined in ICD 3-44005. 
initiator as a piece part and will comply with the performance 
characteristics defined in JSC 08060. 
The detonator cartridge includes an 
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3.2.1.4.12.2 Post Firing Hazards and Obstructions. Subsequent 
to the ordnance ring firing and the severance of the aft exit 
cone, the exit cone plane shall be free from any protrusions which 
are hazardous to personnel or which prevent insertion of a 
recovery/retrieval plug as referenced in ICD 2-4AOO2. 
3.2.1.4.12.3 Mounting Provisions for Ordnance Ring Blast Shield 
and Aft Thermal Shield. 
mount on the aft exit cone assembly, aft of the compliance ring. 
The thermal shield blast protector (blast shield) shall be designed 
to be mounted between the ordnance ring and the aft thermal shield 
in accordance with the requirements referenced in ICD 3-44003. 
The ordnance ring shall be designed to 
3.2.1.4.12.4 Ordnance Cables and Brackets. The aft exit cone 
~ severance ordnance cable and brackets shall be installed in 
accordance with the requirements referenced in ICD 3-44005. 
3.2.1.5 Ignition System. The SRM shall use a head-end mounted 
ignition system comprised of two initiators, an electro-mechanical 
safe and arm (S&A) device, and an igniter. The ignition system 
design shall meet the requirements specified in ICD 3-44005, 
Paragraph 3.2.1.6 and the following: 
a. The ignition system shall preclude hot gas leakage during 
and subsequent to motor ignition. 
b. The igniter and the S&A shall be separable from each 
other. 
3.2.1.5.1 S&A Device. With the S&A device in the I1arrnl1 position, 
a pyrotechnic charge contained in the barrier-booster assembly 
shall be ignited when either one or both of the initiators are 
fired. Firing of the initiators shall be initiated upon receipt 
of electrical power from the Pyro Initiator Controller (PIC) in 
the SRB. Gases generated by the ignited booster charge shall be 
vented axially into the igniter initiator chamber to provide the 
energy flow required to achieve igniter initiation. The design 
of the SfA device shall have the capability to meet the following 
requirements : 
a. Enable and inhibit ignition. 
b. Perform its intended function when either or both of 
the initiators are fired with the S&A device in the 
armed position. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
i. 
j. 
k. 
1. 
m. 
n. 
0. 
P* 
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Prevent ignition when the S&A device is in the safe 
position and either or both of the initiators fire. 
Provide change of position from safe-to-arm and 
arm-to-safe through simplex command and control circuits 
and simplex actuation devices. 
Provide simplex remote position indication in both the 
safed and armed positions. 
Provide direct visual position indication in both the 
safed and armed positions. 
Permit manual safing. 
Prevent manual arming. 
Provide a 90° (minimum) out-of-line mechanical barrier. 
Provide a mechanical safety pin that prevents rotation 
of the barrier while it is in place and moves the S&A 
device into the safe position from the full arm or any 
intermediate position when manually installed. 
A l1safe-arrn1l talk back switch shall be provided. This 
switch shall be located on the barrier booster end of 
the S&A device motor drive shaft. 
Shall use two initiators (government furnished equipment) 
and shall comply with the requirements of JSC 08060. 
Prior to S & A  shipment, each initiator shall be installed 
in the S&A and 100 percent leak checked following 
installation. 
Shall allow installation in only one position (rotational 
orientation) . 
Shall allow each initiator to be lockwired in place. 
Provide for the installation of two initiators into the 
barrier-booster. 
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3.2.1.5.2 Igniter Design. The igniter design shall be in 
accordance with the ignition system requirements specified in 
Paragraph 3.2.1.5. The igniter design shall provide ports to 
accommodate the instrumentation as specified in ICD 3-44005 and 
provide ease of service, access, and replacement. The igniter 
hardware and materials shall not form any debris which is capable 
of damaging any other component from the beginning of ignition 
interval to the end of action time. The igniter shall be capable 
of being installed in only one predetermined rotational position 
onto the forward end of the SRM forward segment. Installation 
shall be accomplished from the outside of the SRM forward segment. 
3.2.1.6 Electrical and Instrumentation. The electrical and 
instrumentation system is comprised of electrical components that 
are attached to the SRM and shall comply with the following 
requirements: 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
4. 
h. 
The electrical power, instrumentation and electrical 
control interfaces shall meet the requirements specified 
in ICD 3-44005. 
The SRM shall provide the necessary mounting for 
installing the systems tunnel as defined in ICD 3-44008. 
The electrical and electronic equipment shall meet the 
requirements of JSC-SL-E-0002 and MIL-STD-462. Specific 
tests which are to be performed will be approved by 
MSFC. 
In addition to the tests conducted per JSC-SL-E-0002, 
the susceptibility characteristics of critical input 
circuitry shall be determined by tests or analyses. 
The design shall meet the electromagnetic compatibility 
requirements of JSC-SL-E-0001, JSC-SL-E-0002, MIL-B-5087, 
and MIL-STD-462. 
The structural and electrical parts shall meet the 
electrical bonding requirements of MIL-B-5087. 
Criticality 1 and 2 electrical, electronic, and 
electromechanical (EEE) parts shall be selected and 
controlled in accordance with MSFC-DWG-85M03936 "EEE 
Parts Selection and Application Guidelines for the Space 
Shuttle External Tank and Solid Rocket Motor Boostertt. 
Electrical and electronic reference designations shall 
be in accordance with MSFC-STD-349. 
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i. Electrical solder joints, where required, shall be in 
accordance with NHB 5300.4(3A) as supplemented by JSC 
08800. 
j. Crimping and wire wrap requirements shall be in accordance 
with NHB 5300.4 (3H) . 
3.2.1.6.1 S&A Electrical Characteristics. 
3.2.1.6.1.1 Electrical Circuits. The following JSCM 8080 Manned 
Spacecraft Design Criteria and Standards shall apply to the design 
of the electrical circuits: 4B, 12A, 13, 18, 19, 20A, 28, 31, 32, 
36, 37, 69, 77, 80, 81, 85, 95, 98, 99, 100, 109, 112, 115, 116, 
119, 121, 125, 128, and 148. 
3.2.1.6.1.2 Electrical Connector. The electrical connector for 
the arming and monitor circuits shall be of the Bendix vlAquaconvv 
series and shall be in accordance with ICD 3-44005. The vvSafe-Armlv 
talkback switch shall utilize Bendix connector NAJ-OH-8-35P as 
defined in ICD 3-44005. The type of connector mounting to the 
S&A shall be optional. JSCM 8080 Standards 63 and 101 shall apply. 
3.2.1.6.1.3 Power Supply. The S&A device shall meet all 
performance requirements of this specification using a power supply 
furnished for S&A device operation which has the following 
characteristics as defined by ICD 3-44005: 
a. Steady state voltage limits of 24 to 32 vdc 
b. Transient voltage limits of 20 to 36.7 vdc 
c. Recovery to steady state limits within 200 milliseconds 
3.2.1.6.1.4 Safe and Arming Time/Voltage. The S&A device shall 
Ivarmvv or Ivsafevv within one second at 24 plus 1 minus 0 vdc. The 
S&A shall cycle with the specified voltages at an atmospheric 
pressure of from 630 to 770 millimeters of mercury. 
3.2.1.6.1.5 Current Requirements. The current required in the 
motor circuit for actuation shall not exceed 3 amperes at 32 vdc. 
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3.2.1.6.1.6 Electrical Bonding Resistance. The electrical 
resistance between A&M and the B-B portions of the S&A device and 
between the S&A device and the igniter shall be less than 2.5 
milliohms at initial assembly. 
3.2.1.6.2 Instrumentation. Operational flight measurements shall 
be as defined in ICD 3-44005. The instrumentation shall be capable 
of launch readiness checkout after ground system connection on 
the launch pad. Sensors to control heating shall be as defined in 
ICD 3-44005. 
3.2.1.6.2.1 Operational Flight Instrumentation. The Operational 
Flight Instrumentation (OFI) shall monitor the chamber pressure 
of the SRMs over the range from 0 to 1000 psia. The chamber 
pressure measurement shall be accurate to plus or minus 15 psi. 
The instrumentation shall operate at a steady state input voltage 
level of from 22 to 32 vdc which has transient levels of from 20 
to 36.7 vdc for periods of up to 200 milliseconds. The 
instrumentation shall provide a signal from 0 to 5 vdc with a 
response of 50 Hz. The operational pressure transducers (OPTs) 
shall be capable of withstanding a 5000 psi maximum assembly test 
pressure without leakage when leakage is defined as a visual 
indication of test fluid. After being subjected to a 5000 psi 
maximum assembly test pressure, the OPTs shall not be required to 
function. To provide the required redundancy, three operational 
pressure transducers (OPTs) shall be used to monitor the SRM chamber 
pressure. The OPT pressure seals shall meet the requirements of 
3.2.1.2. F o r  protection of the redundant components, the OPTs 
shall be mounted to provide the physical separation and orientation 
consistent with the accomplishment of their function as defined 
in ICD 3-44005. 
3.2.1.6.2.2 Cable Mounting Brackets. Cable mounting brackets 
for sensor leads, power supply cables, operational flight 
instrumentation and nozzle LSC double shielded cables shall be 
installed as required. Conductive bonding material is not 
required. Brackets shall preclude the abrading of attached cable 
harnesses as defined in ICD 3-44005. 
3.2.1.6.2.3 Ground Environmental Instrumentation. The Ground 
Evironmental Instrumentation (GEI) shall monitor the temperature 
of the SRBs while on the ground at the pad. It is not required 
to function during flight. These instruments will be monitored 
on the ground through cables with liftoff breakaway connectors. 
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3.2.1.7 Propellants. The SRM and igniter propellants shall be 
developed, characterized, and qualified composite propellant 
formulations that are capable of being bonded to the applicable 
chamber via appropriate insulation, liner, and other inert 
materials. 
3.2.1.8 Insulation. Insulation shall be designed to ensure that 
the mechanical properties of-the case are not degraded by flight 
and/or subsequent thermal soak for worst case PMBT over a range 
of 40 to 90° F. 
3.2.1.8.1 Igniter Insulation. The igniter insulation shall provide 
thermal protection for the main igniter chamber and adapter metal 
parts to ensure that SRM operation does not degrade their functional 
integrity or make them unsuitable for refurbishment. The insulation 
shall ensure a maximum adapter to insulation and igniter chamber 
to insulation interface temperature of 300° F during action time 
and a maximum temperature of 400° F during thermal soak conditions 
following web burnout. 
3.2.1.9 Reuseability. Reuseability goals are listed in Table 
IV. Reusability requirements shall not result in degradation of 
SRM hardware below the design safety factor. 
3.2.1.10 Systems Tunnel. The systems tunnel shall provide flight 
environment protection to the SRB cabling and LSC, and shall be 
designed and shall perform according to ECW3-3404. 
3.2.1.10.1 Systems Tunnel Design. The systems tunnel shall be 
designed to attach to the case, accommodate the GFE LSC, provide 
for the Operational Flight Instrumentation (OFI) and as a goal, 
provide for at least 30 percent of the volume of OF1 for the 
Development Flight Instrumentation (DFI). 
3.2.1.10.2 Thermal Protection. When exposed to the thermal 
environments of 3.2.7.2, the tunnel shall maintain cable and LSC 
temperature at or below that specified in ICD 3-44008. 
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3.2.1.10.3 Venting/Sealing. Tunnel must be designed to the extent 
necessary to prevent rain and hot gas entry into the tunnel. 
Tunnel venting will be used if necessary to relieve internal 
pressure loading. 
3.2.1.10.4 Structural Integrity. The structural integrity of 
the systems tunnel shall withstand the induced environments 
identified in 3.2.7.2. 
1 
3.2.1.10.5 Grounding. The cable tunnel shall provide a low 
resistance path which is electrically continuous both axially and 
circumferentially. Bonding across joints and interfaces shall be 
2.5 milliohms or less. The tunnel shall be grounded to the motor 
case every five feet or less to provide a path for lightning current 
from the tunnel to the motor case. a 
3.2.2 Physical. 
3.2.2.1 Design Envelope. Design geometry shall conform to the 
dimensions shown in Figure 4 and meet the interface requirements 
referenced in Paragraph 3.6.2. 
3.2.2.2 Mass Properties. 
3.2.2.2.1 Control Weight (Inert). The inert weight (see 6.1.1), 
excluding GFE items installed by others, shall not exceed TBD. 
3.2.2.2.2 Propellant Weight. The total loaded propellant weight 
(see 6.1.1) shall be a minimum of TBD. 
b 
n 
1 
a 3.2.2.2.3 Center of Gravity. The center of gravity shall be within the envelope defined below. 
Longitudinal Vertical Lateral 
Condition Axis (XI Axis (Z) Axis (Yl 
Inert (See 6.1.1) 
Loaded 
TBD -0.2 to +0.2 TBD _ _ _  
TBD -0.3 to +0.3 TBD 
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3.2.2.2.4 Accuracy Requirements. The weight and CG accuracy 
requirements for each measurement shall be within 0.2 percent and 
1.0 inch respectively for the reduced mass property. 
3.2.3 Reliability. The reliability program shall comply with 
the requirements established in NHB 5300.4(1D-2). The design 
shall minimize the probability of failure in a cost effective 
manner taking into consideration the potential failure modes 
identified and defined by Failure Modes Effects Analyses. However, 
cost shall not be considered as a criteria in selecting between 
two or more design solutions with differing reliability potential. 
Reliability will take precedence over cost effectiveness. 
3.2.3.1 Primary Structure, Thermal Protection, Pressure Vessels. 
The primary structure, thermal protection, and pressure vessel 
subsystems shall be designed to preclude failure by use of adequate 
design safety factors, relief provisions, fracture control, or 
safe life and/or fail safe characteristics. 
3.2.3.2 Flight Vehicle Subsystem Functional. The redundancy 
requirements for subsystems (except primary structure, thermal 
protection, and pressure vessels) shall be established on an 
individual subsystem basis, but shall not be less than fail safe. 
This fail safe requirement does not apply to the premature firing 
failure mode of pyrotechnic devices and functional systems, except 
associated avionics (electrical and instrumentation). 
3.2.3.3 Isolation of Subsystem Anomalies. Isolation of anomalies 
of time-critical functions shall be provided such that a faulty 
subsystem element can be deactivated either automatically or 
manually without disrupting its own or other subsystems. 
ground operations, capability to fault isolate to the Line 
Replaceable Unit (LRU) (or group of units) without disconnections 
or use of carry-on equipment, shall be provided. 
During 
3.2.4 Maintainability. Any maintenance and/or replacement 
functions required during or after stacking shall be capable of 
being accomplished within the 160 hour Shuttle turnaround 
requirement. 
Replaceable Units (LRUs) shall be identified and verified. 
Interface connections and maintenance operations are to be 
performed with standard tools wherever possible. 
The times required to remove/replace Line 
Subsystem 
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elements, e.g. electrical, ignition and nozzle assemblies, shall 
be capable of checkout and servicing while installed. 
that require hoisting or lifting devices for installation shall 
be self-aligning. Accessability of all LRUs for maintenance 
functions shall be a design consideration. 
Components 
3.2.5 Operational Availability. 
3.2.5.1 Assembly/Disassembly of Segments. The SRM shall be 
capable of assembly/disassembly in both the vertical and 
horizontal position. The SRM shall be capable of vertical 
assembly in a manner to meet the alignment criteria of MSFC-DWG- 
10A00516 without a requirement for optical equipment. 
3.2.5.2 Assembly and Checkout Schedule. Assembly and checkout 
of the SRMs (2) shall be compatible with the space shuttle 
turnaround schedule and shall be accomplished within the time 
allotted f o r  buildup and checkout of the SRB. Each critical path 
of redundant subsystems shall be capable of verification of 
operational status during ground operations. 
3.2.5.3 Hold, Launch, and Recycle Requirements. The SRM shall 
be capable of supporting a Shuttle launch within a twenty-four 
hour notification-for-launch period and maintaining a launch 
standby status for 24 hours. The SRM shall also be capable of 
being launched from a standby status within 120 minutes. 
3.2.5.4 Solid Rocket Booster to External Tank Buildup and 
Mating. The SRM assembly and verification on the mobile launcher 
(ETR) or launch pad (WTR) shall be required prior to mating to 
the external tank. 
3.2.5.5 Retargeting. The SRM shall be capable of meeting the 
Space Shuttle retargeting to a dissimilar mission requirement 
within 16 hours and this requirement shall not preclude the 
capability to retarget within two hours. 
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3.2.5.6 Useful Life. Both new and refurbished SRMs components 
and subassemblies shall be capable of meeting the performance 
requirements of this document after a maximum storage period of 
five years in uncontrolled humidity, within a temperature range 
of +32O F to +95O F, and/or exposure to uncontrolled humidity and 
to ambient temperatures and times during transportation and 
handling as specified below: 
a. Transportation to ETR lJ 2J 
(1) Up to 3 hour exposure: minimum temperature -7O F, 
maximum temperature 102O F. 
(2) 24 hour exposure: average daily minimum 
temperature 5 O  F, average daily-maximum temperature 
89O F. 
(3) 9 days exposure: average daily minimum temperature 
16O F, average daily maximum temperature 85O F. 
b. Transportation to WTR lJ 2J 
(1) Up to 3 hour exposure: minimum temperature 3 O  F, 
maximum temperature 113O F. 
(2) 24 hour exposure: average daily minimum 
temperature 1l0 F, average daily maximum 
temperature 98O F. 
(3) 9 day exposure: average daily minimum temperature 
20° F, average daily maximum temperature 93O F. 
The five year useful life begins following SRM component 
acceptance by NASA. 
lJ Logarithmic interpolation shall be used for determination of 
requirements for exposure times which are between 3 and 24 hour 
or between 24 hour and 9 days. 
2J Interior temperature shall be measured and recorded during 
transportation in each shipping container for each shipment. 
3.2.5.7 Recovery and Refurbishment. The SRM and its subsystems 
shall be capable of reuse following recovery and retrieval after 
submersion in sea water for up to seven days (168 hours) in 
accordance with the reusability goals in Table IV. 
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3.2.6 Safety. The Safety Program shall comply with NHB 5300.4 
(1D-2) and the following safety requirements: 
3.2.6.1 Flight Safety. The SRM and its subsystems shall 
eliminate hazards by appropriate design features, or prevent 
hazards through the use of safety factors and safety devices, or 
counter hazardous conditions by special procedures. 
3.2.6.2 Ground Safety. The SRM shall preclude and/or counteract 
failures or hazards that would jeopardize personnel safety or 
damage/degrade the SRM during manufacturing, handling, 
transportation, turnaround, maintenance and refurbishment 
operations. 
3.2.6.3 Personnel Safety. Provisions for personnel safety shall 
be in accordance with the following: 
a. Safety Devices. Known hazards which cannot be 
eliminated through design selection shall be reduced to 
an acceptable level through the use of appropriate 
safety devices as part of the system, subsystem, or 
equipment. 
b. Warning Devices. Where it is not possible to preclude 
the existence or occurrence of a known hazard, devices 
shall be employed for the timely detection of the 
condition and the generation of an adequate warning 
signal. Warning signals and their application shall be 
designed to minimize the probability of wrong signals 
or of improper personnel reaction to the signal. 
3.2.6.4 Explosive and/or Ordnance Safety. The propellants for 
the SRM and the igniter shall meet the requirements of hazard 
classification 1.3 as defined in the Army Material Command 
Regulation Safety Manual AMCR 385-100, or DoD Contractor's 
Safety Manual for Ammunition, Explosives, and Related Dangerous 
Materials, DoD 4145.26. The SRM segments and ignition system 
less initiators shall have a DOT explosive classification of 
Class B. 
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3.2.6.5 Debris Prevention. The SRM shall be designed to preclude 
the shedding of debris (see 6.1.1) from the elements during 
prelaunch and flight operations that would jeopardize the flight 
crew and/or mission success, 
3.2.7 Environment. 
3.2.7.1 Natural Environment. The SRM shall withstand the natural 
environments defined in JSC 07700, Volume X, Appendix 10.10, and 
the air and sea temperature environments and salinity of 
SE-019-043-2H. 
3.2.7.2 Induced Environment. The SRM shall withstand the induced 
environmental conditions as defined in the following documents: 
Thermal 
Base Heating - SD73-SH-0181-3 
Launch and Ascent - SD73-SH-0181-3 
Re-entry - SE-019-053-2H 
Interface - SD74-SH-0144, ICD 3-44003 
Loads 
Vibration, Acoustic and Shock - SE-019-049-2H and 
SE-019-067-2H. In case of conflict, SE-019-049-2H shall 
take precedence over SE-019-067-2H. 
Prelaunch through Separation - SE-019-057-2H, Book 1 as 
changed by SA42-280-86 
Post Separation through Recovery - SE-019-057-2H, Book 2 
(interpolated for a vertical velocity of 85 feet per 
second) ICDs 3-44001, 3-44003, 3-44004, 3-44008 
Dynamic Aeroelasticity 
External panels shall be free of panel flutter at 1.5 times 
the local dynamic pressure at the appropriate temperature 
and mach number for all flight regimes. 
Transportation Loads 
During transportation, the flight structure shall not be 
subjected to loads more severe than the structural 
capabilities if the SRM and of its components which have 
been designed to meet the flight load requirements. 
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3.2.8 Transportability/Transportation. The SRM and its component 
parts, when protected in accordance with the Preparation for 
Delivery requirements of Section 5, shall be capable of being 
handled and transported by rail or other suitable means to and 
from fabrication, test, operational launch, recovery/retrieval, 
and refurbishment sites. The SRM and its components shall be 
compatible with the handling, packaging, and transportation 
systems to the extent that: 
a. The size and weight of the SRM and its components does 
not exceed the limitations of handling, packaging, and 
transportation systems. The shipping envelope 
limitations for routine rail transportation shall be as 
shown in Figure 5. 
b. No loads are induced in the SRM and its components 
during transportation and handling which will produce 
stresses, internal loads, or deflections in excess of 
the structural capability of the SRM and its components 
which have been designed to the requirements of 3.2.7 
and 3.3.6.1 through 3.3.6.5. 
c. The SRM and its components are adequately protected, by 
passive means, against natural environments during 
transportation and handling. 
3.2.9 Storage. 
3.2.9.1 Post Acceptance Requirements. The performance capability 
of the SRM or of any of the separate deliverable end items which 
comprise the SRM after accceptance by NASA shall not be adversely 
affected by a maximum storage period of five years within a 
temperature range of +32 to +95O F. The assembled SRM shall be 
capable of being stored in the vertical position for up to 180 
days launch pad stay time and capable of holding on the launch 
pad for 14 days without GSE support. The assembled SRM shall 
meet all requirements specified herein, provided the propellant 
operational mean bulk temperature is within the limits of +40 to 
+90° F. Prior to final assembly, the SRM segments and subsystems 
shall be capable of being stored in either a horizontal or 
vertical position in either their shipping containers or with 
protective end closures and covers. 
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3.2.9.2 Storage/Age Control. Storage monitoring of the SRM and 
its subsystems shall require only electrical grounding and visual 
inspection. Natural rubber items, propellant and liner contained 
in safety critical components, except for electrical connectors, 
accessories and the nozzle flex bearing, shall be age controlled 
in accordance with the requirements of JSC-SE-R-0006 (as changed 
by approved deviation RDW0001R2, see 10.1) as defined in the 
Material Selection and Control Plan, TWR-10192. 
3.3 Design and Construction Standards. 
3.3.1 Selection of Specifications and Standards. All materials, 
parts and processes shall be defined by specifications and 
standards selected in accordance with MIL-STD-143, except that 
NASA documents referenced in this specification shall take 
precedence. Rationale for the selection of contractor 
specifications and standards over existing higher order or 
precedence standards and specifications shall be compiled and 
maintained for historical record and shall be made available to 
the procuring activity upon request. This rationale shall include 
an identification of each higher order or precedence specification 
or standard examined and state why each was unacceptable. 
purposes of this order or precedence, commercial materials, parts 
and processes shall be considered equivalent to contractor 
standards. 
For 
3.3.1.1 Selection of Materials, Parts, and Processes. All SRM 
materials, parts, and processes shall be selected in accordance 
with the requirements of TWR-10192 and shall be defined by 
specifications and standards suitable for the intended purpose and 
approved by Morton Thiokol material and engineering personnel 
prior to their incorporation into the SRM design. The SRM 
material selection list and use instructions requirements shall 
be in accordance with SE-019-094-2H as defined in TWR-10192 except 
that in lieu of MSFC Material Usage Agreement Form 551, the Morton 
Thiokol Material Usage Agreement Form TC 4658 shall be used. 
NASA approved authority and responsibilities for SRM materials, 
parts, and engineering processes shall be as specified in 
TWR-10192. 
3.3.1.2 Parts Selection. 
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3.3.1.2.1 EEE Parts. EEE parts shall be selected in accordance 
with MSFC-DWG-85M03936. 
satisfy design requirements, selection of parts shall consider 
previously qualified parts and selection shall minimize the number 
of styles and generic types. 
When EEE parts listed therein will not 
3.3.1.2.2 Standard and Commercial Parts. MS, AN, or MIL-STD 
parts shall be used whenever suitable for the intended purpose. 
If no suitable MS, AN, or MIL-STD parts are applicable or 
available, commercial parts may be used provided they conform to 
the requirements of this specification and do not affect the 
qualification status of the end item hardware. 
3.3.1.2.3 Instrumentation Selection. Commonality of sensors and 
measurement range standardization with other Shuttle system 
elements shall be implemented where practical. 
3.3.1.3 Drawing Standards. Drawings and associated lists shall 
be prepared in accordance with requirements of MIL-STD-100, 
MIL-D-1000, Form 2 for Categories B, C, E, F, H, I, and J; 
MIL-D-1000, Form 2 or Form 3 for Categories A, D, and G; and the 
following subparagraphs. Drawings and associated lists shall be 
identified by the contractor's code identification and number. 
Deviations from these requirements are permissible, and encouraged 
if cost effective, with the prior approval of MSFC. 
3.3.1.3.1 Flight/Non-Flight Critical Items. Drawings and 
associated lists shall be prepared in accordance with the 
requirements of Category E, Form 2 of MIL-D-1000. 
3.3.1.3.2 Deliverable Non-Flight Items. Drawings for deliverable 
non-flight items shall be prepared in accordance with requirements 
of applicable Categories C, E, F, G, or H, Form 2 of MIL-D-1000. 
3.3.1.3.3 Legibility. Drawings and reprints shall be of 
sufficient clarity such that every line, number, letter, and 
character data is clearly legible and readable. Microfilming 
shall be in accordance with NHB 1440.4 for Type 1, Class I 
microfilm. 
3.3.1.3.4 Drawing Quality. The drawings shall be in accordance 
with the quality assurance requirements of MIL-D-1000. 
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3.3.1.3.5 Delivery Requirements. The delivery requirements for 
drawings shall be as specified in the Information Requirements 
Document DPD 400. 
3.3.1.3.6 Drafting Practices. Drawings shall be prepared using 
the drawing practices requirements of MIL-STD-100, specified in 
MIL-D-1000, with the conditions and exceptions, delineated in DPD 
400. 
3.3.1.4 Units. The requirement for use of the international 
system of units has been waived. 
3.3.1.5 Traceability. Traceability shall be provided by 
assigning a traceability identification to each SRM part and 
material and providing a means of correlating each to its 
historical records, and conversely, the records must be traceable 
to each part and material throughout the life of each component. 
3.3.2 General. 
3.3.2.1 NASA/JSC Standards. The SRM shall comply with the 
applicable standards listed in JSCM 8080. JSCM 8080 Standards 
requirements shall not be applicable to off-the-shelf hardware. 
JSCM 8080 Standard 88 shall be applicable to SRM wire splicing. 
JSCM 8080 Standard 107, Itseparate Stock for Spaceflight Parts and 
Material", requirements as changed by DAR SRM 0005 (see 10.1) 
shall be applicable. JSCM Standard 133B requirements for harness, 
wire, and connector testing are not applicable. 
3.3.3 Aeronautical. This paragraph is not applicable to this 
specification. 
3.3.4 Civil. This paragraph is not applicable to this 
specification. 
3.3.5 Electrical. Electrical and electronic equipment shall 
meet the following requirements: 
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3.3.5.1 Electromagnetic Interference. The SRM shall be designed 
and tested in accordance with the requirements of JSC-SL-E-0001, 
JSC-SL-E-0002, MIL-STD-462 and ICD 3-44005. Definitions and 
system of units shall comply with MIL-STD-463. 
3.3.5.2 Electrical Bonding. Structural and electrical parts 
shall meet the bonding requirements of MIL-B-5087 in all areas, 
except in the area of lightning protection where the requirements 
of JSC 07636 shall apply. 
3.3.5.3 Soldering. Soldering of all electrical connections shall 
comply with the requirements of NHB 5300.4(3A) as supplemented by 
JSC 08800. 
3.3.5.4 Circuit Boards. Soldered printed wire board assemblies 
shall be designed in accordance with MSFC-STD-154 and parts shall 
be mounted in accordance with MSFC-STD-136. 
3.3.5.5 Static Electricity and Lightning Protection. Static 
electricity and lightning protection shall comply with the 
requirements of JSC 07636, JSC 20007, and ICD 3-44005. 
3.3.5.6 Harnesses and Cables. Harnesses and cables shall comply 
with the requirements of NHB 5300.4(3G). 
3.3.6 Mechanical. 
3.3.6.1 Design Safety Factors. 
3.3.6.1.1 General Safety Factors. 
Before SRB separation 
Yield factor of safety = 1.10 
Ultimate factor of safety = 1.40 
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After SRB separation before water impact 
Yield factor of safety = 1.10 
Ultimate factor of safety = 1.25 
During water impact 
Stiffener rings = 1.00* 
Yield factor of safety = 1.10* 
Ultimate factor of safety = 1.25* 
* This is a design goal only for water impact loads. 
will be conducted on the effects of water impact loads for 
the following water entry conditions: 
a. Nominal vertical velocity of 85 fps. 
b. Horizontal velocity of 0 to 45 fps. 
c. Impact angle -5 to +5 degrees. 
Analyses 
3.3.6.1.2 Safety Factors for Pressures. 
Before SRB separation 
Yield pressure 
Ultimate pressure 
= 1.20 x limit pressure 
= 1.40 x limit pressure 
(6.1.1) 
After SRB separation before water impact 
Yield pressure 
Ultimate pressure 
= 1.10 x limit pressure 
= 1.25 x limit pressure 
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During water impact 
Yield pressure = 1.10* x limit pressure 
ultimate pressure = 1.25* x limit pressure 
Buckling pressure = 1.00* 
* This is a design goal only for water impact loads. 
will be conducted on the effects of water impact loads for 
the following water entry conditions: 
a. 
b. 
c. Impact angle -5 to +5 degrees. 
Analyses 
Nominal vertical velocity of 85 fps. 
Horizontal velocity of 0 to 45 fps. 
Results of these analyses will be evaluated and the calculated 
factors of safety will be the basis of attrition rate 
determinations. 
3.3.6.1.3 Internal Insulation. The SRM internal insulation 
system consisting of case side wall thermal insulation, stress 
relief flaps, and propellant grain inhibitors shall utilize the 
SRM component design configurations (Ref. TWR- TBD) as 
Safety factors are determined based on a comparison of material 
affected depth against minimum design thickness. Post-test and 
post-flight verification of insulation compliance with design 
safety factor requirements shall be based on a comparison of 
material affected depth against minimum design thickness. 
baseline. 
3.3.6.1.3.1 Case Insulation. The case insulation shall have a 
minimum safety factor of 1.5 assuming normal, motor operation and 
1.2 assuming loss of a castable inhibitor. 
3.3.6.1.3.2 Metal Part Joint - Insulation. Case insulation 
adjacent to metal part field joints and extending over factory 
joints shall have a minimum safety factor of 2.0. 
3.3.6.1.3.3 Multiple Insulation Materials. Case insulation in 
sandwich constructionn regions (aft dome and center segment aft 
end) shall have a minimum safety factor of 1.5 (performance ratio 
TBD) . 
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3.3.6.1.3.4 Inhibitors. The aft facing, castable, propellant 
grain inhibitors shall have a minimum safety factor of 1.25. The 
forward facing, propellant grain inhibitors shall have a minimum 
safety factor of 1.5. 
3.3.6.1.3.5 Insulation Performance. Insulation performance shall 
be calculated using actual pre- and post-motor operation 
insulation thickness measurements. 
requirements shall be calculated using minimum insulation design 
thickness. 
Compliance with safety factor 
3.3.6.1.4 Insulation/Liner Bond. The safety factor for the 
physical properties of the insulation/liner bond shall be 2.0 
minimum during the life of the SRM. The bond safety factor shall 
be based on the bond strength of the bond line. 
for determining bond line strength shall be submitted to MSFC for 
approval. 
The procedure 
3.3.6.1.5 Propellant and Propellant/Liner Bond. The safety 
factor for propellant and propellant/liner bond shall be 2.0 
minimum during storage and launch with the exceptions that the 
propellant safety factor during horizontal storage shall be: 1.4 
in the forward segment transition region, 1.8 in the forward 
segment flap and 1.7 in the center segment flap. The safety 
factor requirements are for a minimum PMBT of +52O F for the five 
year life. 
3.3.6.1.6 Nozzle Safety Factors. The minimum design safety 
factors for the nozzle assembly primary ablative materials shall 
be as listed below for the worst nozzle environment over a PMBT 
range of +40 to +90° F. 
a. All components except flex bearing thermal protector 
1. Erosion: 2.0 times maximum predicted local final 
erosion depth. 
2. Char: 1.25 times maximum predicted local final 
(end of action time) char thickness. 
b. Flex bearing thermal protector: (material affected depth) 1.5 
times the maximum predicted final material affected depth. 
3. Thermal Protection: 1.0 on the insulation. 
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3.3.6.2 Allowable Mechanical Properties. Fracture control 
requirements and applications shall be as specified in TWR-10184, 
sRM fracture control plan, supplement 2 fracture control plan for 
Space Shuttle Ignition System, TBD, fracture control plan for 
Space Shuttle Block I1 SRM motor case, and TBD fracture control 
plan for the Space Shuttle Block I1 SRM nozzle. Fracture 
mechanics properties of materials shall be determined in 
accordance with ASTM E 399. Values for other allowable mechanical 
properties of structures and joints in their design environments; 
i.e., subjected to single stresses or combined stresses, shall be 
in compliance with MSFC sources and/or MIL-HDBK-5, MIL-HDBK-17, 
MIL-HDBK-23, or supplier guaranteed and approved properties. 
Where values f o r  mechanical properties of new materials, or 
properties of existing materials in a new environment are not 
available, they shall be determined by analytical or test methods 
approved by MSFC. Generally, a larger safety factor shall be 
incorporated into data supported by a small number of samples as 
opposed to that data supported by a large number of samples. 
Where tests are required, they shall be of sufficient number to 
establish values for the mechanical properties on a statistical 
basis. The effects of temperature, thermal cycling and gradients, 
and detrimental environments shall be accounted for in defining 
allowable mechanical properties. 
3.3.6.3 Ultimate Combined Loads. The external, thermally 
induced, and internal pressure loads should be combined in a 
rational manner according to the equation given below to determine 
the design loads. Any other loads induced in the structure, 
e.g., during manufacturing, shall be combined. No load conditions 
which exceed manned flight loads shall be considered. In no case 
shall the ratio of the allowable load to the combined limit loads 
be less than the designated Safety Factor (SF). 
(Kl) L(externa1) + (Kl) L(Therma1) + (K2) L(Pressure) = Ultimate 
Combined Load 
SF of 1.4 for boost conditions when the term is 
additive to produce the ultimate combined load. 
- K1, K2 
K1, K2 = Calculated after SRB separation based upon 
conditions prior to separation. Calculated values 
shall be the basis for attrition rate 
determination. 
K1, K2 - 1.0 when the term is subtractive to produce the 
ultimate combined load. 
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L(Externa1) - Mechanically external applied loads, e.g., 
L (Thermal) - Thermally induced loads 
inertial loads, aerodynamic pressure 
L (Pressure) - Maximum expected operating pressure (MEOP) 
where additive to produce the ultimate 
combined load. 
L (Pressure) - Minimum expected operating pressure when 
subtractive to produce the ultimate combined 
load. 
This equation is applicable to either tension or compression 
loads. 
inplane stresses, including loads resulting from temperature 
changes, shall be investigated for buckling failure. The 
evaluation of buckling strength shall consider the combined action 
of primary and secondary stresses and their effects on (1) general 
instability, (2) local or panel instability, (3) crippling, and 
(4) creep. Design loads for buckling shall be ultimate loads. 
Loads tending to alleviate buckling shall not be increased by the 
ultimate factor of safety. Destabilizing limit loads shall be 
increased by the ultimate factor of safety although stabilizing 
loads shall not. 
All structural components that are subject to compressive 
3.3.6.4 Proof Pressure Factors. Fracture mechanics analyses 
shall be performed to establish the proof pressure factors 
required to determine the maximum possible flaw size for 
verification of service life with respect to the cyclic and 
sustained load history. 
determined by fracture mechanics analyses using typical K sub IC 
values. 
The proof factor to be used shall be 
3.3.6.4.1 Proof Factor Determination. The proof factor shall be 
determined for a proof test to be conducted prior to each mission 
and is intended to show a potential of four additional missions. 
All cyclic and sustained loads shall be considered in determining 
the proof factor. A minimum proof factor of 1.05 is established 
as a lower bound. 
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3.3.6.5 Life Factors. Structures and components shall both be 
designed to demonstrate the following requirements as applicable: 
a. Low Cycle Fatigue (<10,000 cycles) - 4 times the cycles 
to be expected in the number of uses. 
b. High Cycle Fatigue (>10,000 cycles) - 10 times the 
cycles to be expected in the number of uses. 
c. Fracture Mechanics - The crack growth to be expected in 
one service life (the number of uses). 
3.3.6.6 Welding. Welding of steels, including stainless steels, 
shall be in accordance with MSFC-DWG-10509308. Resistance welds 
shall comply with the requirements of MIL-W-6858. Weldments of 
aluminum shall comply with the requirements of MSFC-SPEC-504. 
3.3.6.7 Brazing. Brazing shall comply with the requirements of 
MIL-B-7883. 
3.3.6.8 Adhesive Bonding. Adhesive bonding shall meet the 
requirements of MSFC-SPEC-445 (as changed by approved deviation 
RDW0043R1, see 10.1). 
3.3.6.9 Screw Threads. Screw threads for threaded fasteners 
used on Shuttle System hardware shall be of unified thread form 
in accordance with MIL-S-7742 or MIL-S-8879, as applicable; 
a. Material strength levels up to, but not including, 160 
KSI may be threaded per MIL-S-7742 or MIL-S-8879. 
Rolled threads are preferred. 
b. Material strength levels 160 KSI and above shall be 
threaded per MIL-S-8879. External threads shall be 
rolled after heat treatment. 
Threads shall be class 3 for initial use and may be class 2 for 
reuse except that class 2 is acceptable for refurbished 
pyrotechnic devices. 
3.3.6.10 Locking Threaded Parts. All threaded fasteners except 
nozzle leak test port plugs and internal nozzle bolted joints 
shall be positively locked. Lock method requirements for ignition 
system components shall be as specified in JSC 08060. Locking 
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methods for other components shall be in accordance with MIL-N- 
8922 and MIL-N-25027. Self-locking devices shall be used one 
time only except for self-locking nuts as specified in MIL-N- 
25027 which are allowed up to 15 reuses. 
3.3.7 Nuclear. This paragraph is not applicable to this 
specification. 
3.3.8 Materials. As a design goal, the SRM design shall not 
include the use of age sensitive materials. 
sensitive materials cannot be avoided, the replacement of such 
materials may be scheduled during the storage period (see 3.2.9). 
Materials will be selected with characteristics that will not 
present hazards to personnel or flight hardware in their intented 
use or environment. The SRM shall not use asbestos-filled 
insulation materials. 
When the use of age 
3.3.8.1 Moisture, Fungus Resistance, and Oxidation Resistance. 
Materials which are non-nutrient to the fungi defined in 
MIL-STD-810, Method 508, should be used. When fungus nutrient 
materials must be used, they should be hermetically sealed or 
treated to prevent fungus growth for a period of five years. 
Materials not meeting this requirement shall be identified as a 
limited life component and the contractor shall identify any 
action required such as inspection, maintenance, or replacement 
periods. 
performance or service life. Materials so treated should be 
protected from moisture or other environments that would be 
sufficient to leach out the protective agent. When cork is used 
for external thermal protection, the cork shall be coated with a 
water resistant protective coating but fungus treatment of the 
cork shall not be required. 
MIL-STD-454 (Requirements No. 4). Materials which are sensitive 
to oxidation shall be treated with a protective coating. 
material and installation design shall minimize absorption and 
entrapment of liquids or gases which would degrade thermal or 
physical performance or present a fire hazard (wicking), and shall 
not require draining, drying or any dedicatd purge system from 
refurbishment through launch. 
Fungus treatment shall not adversely affect unit 
Fungus inert materials are listed in 
All TPS 
3.3.8.2 
a. 
b. 
3.3.8.3 
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Corrosion of Metal Parts. 
Corrosion Protection - Inasmuch as practical, corrosion 
resistant metals shall be used. Dissimilar metals 
shall not be used in combination unless galvanic 
corrosion is prevented by means of protective coatings, 
sealants, or insulation. Consideration shall be given 
to weight, thermal emissivity, and electrical bonding 
requirements. 
treated to resist corrosion. 
metals, finishes, and coatings shall meet the 
requirements of MSFC-SPEC-250. 
Stress Corrosion - The criteria for material selection 
in the design to prevent stress corrosion failure of 
fabricated components shall be in accordance with 
All exposed metal surfaces shall be 
The use of dissimilar 
MSFC-SPEC-522. 
Flammability, Odor and Off-Gassing. Flammability, odor, 
and off-gassing properties of materials to be used in environments 
that support combustion shall be in accordance with NHB 8060.1 as 
defined in TWR-10192. 
3.3.9 Contamination Control. Contamination shall be controlled 
to assure system safety, performance, and reliability. Control 
shall be implemented by a coordinated program in accordance with 
JSC-SN-C-0005 from design concept through procurement, 
fabrication, assembly, test, storage, delivery, operations, and 
maintenance. 
applicable to contamination control. 
shall include consideration of materials compatibility, corrosion 
resistance, and sensitivity to contamination. Fluid systems 
design shall include self-cleaning (filtering) protection 
compatible with component sensitivity. Specific cleanliness 
levels in accordance with JSC-SN-C-0005 shall be established for 
material surfaces, fluid systems, and functional items, as 
required for effective control of contamination. 
identified in JSC-SES-0073 and required for manufacture, test, 
cleanliness evaluation, and operation shall meet the purity, 
cleanliness, and analysis requirements of JSC-SE-S-0073. 
Paragraphs 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 of SE-019-058-2H shall be 
Selection of system design 
Fluids 
3.3.9.1 Cross Contamination. The SRM shall not cause detrimental 
cross contamination (see 6.1.1) of other Space Shuttle elements 
during the flight mission through SRM action time. 
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3.3.10 Coordinate Systems. Coordinate system standards shall be 
compatible with those defined in JSC 09084, Coordinate Systems 
for the Space Shuttle System. 
3.3.11 Interchangeability and Replaceability. Components and 
subsystems shall be capable of application to either the tfrightll 
or lvleftll hand SRM. To meet the thrust differential performance 
requirements of 3.2.1.1.2.3 between the two SRMs on a Shuttle 
vehicle, these two SRMs shall consist of performance matched 
pairs of SRMs. With the exception mentioned above, the definitions 
of item levels item exchangeability, models and related items, 
shall be in accordance with MIL-STD-280. 
3.3.12 Identification and Marking. The SRM component 
identification and marking shall be in accordance with 
MIL-STD-130, except that the "design activity codell, 
Itmanufacturer1s trade mark", and Iflicensor code identificationvg 
need not be combined with the part number when marking parts and 
assemblies. Electrical wiring shall be identified in accordance 
with MIL-STD-681. Packaging marking requirements shall conform 
to the requirements of MIL-STD-129. 
the SRM shall be restricted to appropriate markings or decals as 
necessary. Priority consideration shall be given to weight and 
thermal performance. 
Cosmetic requirements for 
3.3.13 Workmanship. The SRM shall be fabricated, processed, and 
installed using standards of workmanship which are consistent 
with the performance, reliability, and reuse requirements. All 
hardware shall conform with the requirements for form, fit, and 
function defined by design drawings and related specifications. 
The hardware and software shall be free of defects which would 
result in hazardous or unsafe conditions or which could result in 
failure or materially reduce the usability and reusability of the 
SRM for its intended purpose. 
3.3.14 Human Performance/Human Engineering. MIL-STD-1472 shall 
be used as a guide for human engineering design criteria. 
3.4 Logistics. The logistics program shall comply with the 
intent of JSC 07700, Volume XII. 
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3.4.1 Maintenance. The maintenance concept shall be to Itremove 
and replacell to the functional line replaceable unit (LRU) level, 
at the organizational level, and on an unscheduled basis as 
determined from malfunctions. The SRM shall be designed so that 
the maintenance can be accomplished in a manner which will provide 
support of operational time constraints, prevent deterioration of 
inherent design levels of reliability and operating safety, and 
accomplish this support and protection at minimum practical costs. 
3.4.2 Supply. Supply support functions shall comply with the 
intent of J S C  07700, Volume X I I .  
3.4.3 Facilities and Facility Equipment. The SRM shall be 
designed to minimize the need for new logistics facilities. 
Existing facilities and facility equipment must be used for the 
storage of spares and maintenance functions to the maximum 
possible extent. 
3.4.4 Spare Parts. Spare parts shall be standardized and 
off-the-shelf wherever possible and selected for simplicity and 
ease of maintenance. 
3.5 Personnel and Training. The design shall consider tasks to 
be accomplished by operating, test and maintenance personnel. 
Considerations should include safety, accessibility, critical 
tasks, complexity and necessity for training. 
3.6 Interface Requirements. The SRM shall meet the interface 
requirements of the following interfaces: 
3.6.1 Interprogram. This paragraph is not applicable to this 
specification. 
3.6.2 Intraprogram. 
a. I C D  2-00001 Shuttle Vehicle Mold Lines and Protuberances 
b. I C D  2-OA001 Shuttle System/Launch Platform Stacking and 
VAB Servicing 
c. I C D  2-OA002 Space Shuttle Launch Pad and Platform 
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ICD 2-4A001 Solid Rocket Booster Receiving and 
Processing Station 
ICD 2-4AOO2 Solid Rocket Booster Retrieval Station 
ICD 3-44001 SRM to Forward Skirt 
ICD 3-44003 SRM to Aft Skirt and Thrust Vector Control 
Actuator 
ICD 3-44004 Solid Rocket Motor to ET Attach Ring 
ICD 3-44005 Solid Rocket Motor to Solid Rocket Booster 
Electrical and Instrumentation Subsystem 
ICD 3-44008 Systems Tunnel to SRB Systems 
3.6.3 Intraproject. This paragraph is not applicable to this 
specification. 
4.0 VERIFICATION 
4.1 General. Verification shall be accomplished in accordance 
with Table V, Verification Cross Reference Index. 
a. Pyrotechnics Verification. Verification of pyrotechnics 
shall comply with JSC 08060. 
b. SRM Component and Subsystem Verifications. Component 
subsystem and end item verification shall be in 
accordance with the SRB Verification Plan, 
SE-019-019-2H. 
c. Environmental. All secondary mounted components 
required to operate during flight shall be certified as 
complying with SE-019-049-2H by test and analysis. 
4.1.1 Responsibility for Verification. Unless otherwise 
specified in the contract or order, the Morton Thiokol 
Corporation, Space Division, shall be responsible for the 
performance of all verification requirements as specified herein. 
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Except as otherwise specified, Morton Thiokol may utilize its own 
facilities or any commercial laboratory acceptable to the 
Government. The Government reserves the right to perform any of 
the verifications specified herein and to witness and verify the 
results of all verifications accomplished. 
4.1.1.1 Quality Assurance. The Quality Assurance Program shall 
comply with the requirements established in NHB 5300.4(1D-2). 
4.1.1.1.1 Quality Assurance Activities. Quality assurance 
activities shall ensure that the design approach permit and 
facilitate productivity, repeatability, inspectability, 
refurbishability/maintainability, and that related quality 
considerations are well defined. 
4.1.1.1.2 Quality Design Criteria. Quality design criteria 
shall be developed and utilized in the design approach as follows: 
a. Identification of critical hardware characteristics 
necessary for procurement or fabrication. 
b. Identification of tolerances or limits. 
c. Assurance that characteristics which influence quality 
are within inspection I1state-of-the-artff capabilities. 
d. Quality controls at interfaces are defined. 
e. Critical or special process controls are defined. 
4.1.1.1.3 Quality Inspection Requirement. 
a. Nondestructive inspection requirements for materials 
and parts shall be in accordance with MIL-1-6870. 
Prior to performance of penetrant inspection of all 
metallic surfaces which have been previously machined 
or mechanically cleaned, the surfaces shall be etched 
to remove all smeared metal that could mask defects; 
however, 7000 series aluminum parts shall be etched 
only during parts fabrication. 
b. Radiographic inspection of welds in steels shall comply 
with the requirements of MIL-STD-453 for thin material 
and ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, Section VIII, 
Paragraph UW51 for thick materials. Weldments of 
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aluminum shall be inspected per MSFC-SPEC-504. Dye 
penetrant inspection of steel and aluminum weldments 
shall comply with the requirements of MIL-1-6866 and 
prior to penetrant inspection of a weldment surface 
which has been previously machined or mechanically 
cleaned, the surface shall be etched to remove all 
smeared metal that could mask defects. 
4.1.1.1.4 Quality Sampling Requirements. Sampling requirements 
shall be in accordance with MIL-STD-105 and MIL-STD-414. 
4.1.2 Verification Method Selection. Verification methods shall 
include similarity, analysis, inspection, demonstration and 
test. 
upon achievement of verification requirements by a reliable 
method. 
yielding credible data. 
minimum modification shall be considered. 
event practical shall be used for verification. 
selection given in the verification cross reference index (see 
4.3) has been determined by such factors as the available 
knowledge of the design requirements and is based upon design 
maturity, criticality categories, complexity, and risk. The 
following techniques of verification as listed above shall be 
utilized: 
The selection of the verification method shall be based 
Testing shall be planned at the highest level of assembly 
Use of existing test facilities requiring 
The earliest program 
The method 
a. Similarity. Similarity may be used if (1) it can be 
shown that the article is similar or identical in 
design and manufacturing process to another article 
that has been previously qualified to similar criteria, 
and (2) analysis of dissimilarities either in design, 
manufacturing, process or verification criteria, 
substantiates that the article will perform its intended 
function within the specified envelope. 
shall pertain to characteristics such as material, 
configuration, and functional element or assembly, and 
may be applied selectively for applicable environments. 
b. Analysis. Verification by analysis may be used in lieu 
of testing whenever it can be shown by MSFC approved 
analytical techniques that the article will meet the 
applicable technical requirements. Analyses shall be 
performed as required on logic circuits, and sub- 
assemblies, etc. to assure that the design will meet the 
specified requirements. 
Similarity 
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c. Inspection. Verification by inspection shall be used 
whenever it can be shown that inspection techniques are 
adequate to assure that the article will meet the 
applicable technical requirements. Inspection shall be 
used to verify the construction features, compliance 
with drawings, workmanship and physical condition of 
the article. 
d. Demonstration. Demonstration shall be used when actual 
conduct/operation can verify attainment of requirements 
such as service and access, maintainability, 
transportability, and human engineering features. 
e. Test. When inspections and analyses are inadequate to 
verify specified requirements, tests shall be performed 
as necessary for verification. In addition, tests 
shall be performed if the testing will increase the 
level of confidence in the system verification. 
4.1.3 Relationships to Management Reviews. 
4.1.3.1 Preliminary Design Review (PDR). The development and 
verification program shall have been started prior to PDR to 
provide design data to support the preliminary design. Candidate 
materials, designs, and procedures shall be verified by analysis 
and/or similarity and by standard laboratory testing. 
4.1.3.2 Critical Design Review (CDR). At the time of the CDR, 
the development verification program shall provide data to be 
used to obtain approval of the detailed SRM design and performance 
requirements as depicted by drawings and specifications. 
4.1.3.3 Configuration Inspection (CI). At the time of SRM CI, 
the certification phase and the acceptance phase of the 
verification program shall have been accomplished to the extent 
that all SRM design, performance, and acceptance requirements 
identified in this specification have been verified. 
4.1.3.4 Flight Readiness Review. The verification of the 
prelaunch checkout requirements as specified in 4.2.5 shall have 
been accomplished by the time of the flight readiness review for 
each vehicle to be used in the Flight Program. 
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4.1.4 Test/Equipment Failures. When a failure occurs, failure 
analysis shall be accomplished to the extent required to identify 
the cause of the failure before the hardware is removed, altered, 
or the test continued. Additional tests may be conducted when 
their purpose is to resolve the cause of the failure. Failure 
analysis shall also determine if degradation or failure has 
occurred elsewhere in the system as a result of the failure. 
Tests may continue on subsystems not affected by the failure. 
Test failures shall be reported and documented with the results 
of the failure analyses. 
4.1.5 Verification for Unplanned Equipment Uses. The SRM shall 
be used only for the requirements specified in Section 3. There 
shall be no verification for unplanned uses. 
4 . 2  Phased Verification Requirements. 
4.2.1 Development. The development phase of the verification 
program, not accomplished during development per CPW1-3300, shall 
be primarily concerned with those verification activities which 
will provide the engineering data base necessary to support 
design development. The data required will also be used to 
support other phases of the verification program. NASA 
participation in development activities shall be at its 
discretion. 
shall provide data from the verification methods specified in 
4.1.2 to determine the following: 
The development phase of the verification program 
a. Adequacy and optimization of design margins. 
b. Significant failure modes and effects. 
c. The effects of combinations of tolerances and drift on 
performance. 
d. The effects of combinations and sequences of 
environments and stress levels. 
e. Safety parameters and functions. 
f. Overstress conditions where additional confidence or 
design margin data are required to verify safe operating 
conditions. 
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g. Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) susceptibility 
levels. 
h. Compatibility of physical, functional, and operational 
interfaces. 
i. Heat transfer effects on operational systems. 
4.2.1.1 Similarity. See Table V for requirements to be verified 
by similarity. An engineering evaluation shall be documented to 
show that the design differences between the items being developed 
and a previously developed item have no significant adverse 
effects as applied to the SRM; that the previously developed 
similar item was qualified to equal or higher environmental 
stress levels and time durations than required for the item being 
developed: and that the item being developed was fabricated and 
qualified by the same manufacturer as the similar item using the 
same processes, material, and quality control. 
4.2.1.2 Analysis. See Table V for requirements to be verified 
by analysis. An engineering analysis shall be performed using 
reasonable analytical techniques to verify that materials, 
components, or assemblies can meet or exceed the environmental 
requirements. The analytical techniques shall include system 
engineering analysis, statistics, qualitative analysis, analog 
modeling, and computer simulation. The analysis shall be 
documented to provide sufficient data to perform an independent 
verification based on the results of the analysis. An analysis 
report shall document the analysis results, the conclusions 
reached, and establish that the respective component or subsystem 
meets the design requirements. 
shall be available. 
Analysis verification reports 
4.2.1.3 Inspection. See Table V for requirements to be verified 
by inspection. Inspection shall be used to verify all physical 
characteristics that can be independently verified. Inspection 
shall be the preferred method of verification when this method 
can demonstrate compliance with requirements. 
requirements shall be satisfied by quality assurance with approved 
engineering techniques. 
Inspection 
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4.2.1.4 Demonstration. See Table V for requirements to be 
verified by demonstration. 
requirements whenever the physical performance of operations 
involving the article will assure that the article meets the 
applicable technical requirements. 
Demonstration shall be used to verify 
4.2.1.5 Test. 
test. Development testing shall meet the following: 
See Table V for requirements to be verified by 
a. Development tests that are to be used for verification 
shall be conducted on hardware or materials that have 
characteristics similar to flight hardware. The tests 
shall be flexible enough to permit freedom to provide 
assurance (by test results or the analyses of test data) 
that hardware materials meet the environmental stress 
levels, durations, and performance requirements. 
The tests shall be conducted in accordance with the 
test plans and procedures approved and controlled by 
Morton Thiokol. 
b. A development test plan shall be prepared for the 
development phase of the verification plan. 
Qualification requirements will be satisfied during 
development testing on some components when the intent 
to qualify by development test is declared. These 
development tests will meet the requirements of 
qualification testing. 
c. 
4.2.2 Certification. The SRM shall be certified to conform to 
the design performance, physical characteristics, environmental, 
and operating life requirements specified herein. Certification 
shall be achieved by qualification tests, engineering analysis, 
similarity, inspection, and demonstration. Certification shall 
be conducted at the highest level of assembly that is practical 
to verify that the SRM meets or exceeds design performance 
requirements. Certification of Qualification (COQ), MSFC Form 
511, will be prepared to document certification activities of 
each SRM item requiring certification. COQs will be forwarded to 
the MSFC Reliability and Quality Assurance Office (RtQA) for 
approval and file retention. 
Specification No. CPW1-1900 
25 November 1986 
Page 1-64 
4.2.2.1 Similarity. Certification by similarity must be 
documented with Similarity Analysis Report depicting an 
engineering evaluation of design and usage comparison of the SRM 
flight item and the similar item. Qualification test results of 
the similar item should be included in the Similarity Analysis 
Report. See Table V for requirements to be certified by 
similarity. 
4.2.2.2 Analysis. An Engineering Analysis Report must be 
prepared to document the analytical technique and results used to 
certify a SRM item. See Table V for requirements to be certified 
by analysis. 
4.2.2.3 Inspection. See Table V for requirements to be verified 
by inspection. 
4.2.2.4 Demonstration. See Table V for requirements to be 
verified by demonstration. 
4.2.2.5 Test. Qualification tests will be performed on flight 
configured items to formally certify the design performance and 
some environmental requirements. Qualification tests will be 
conducted under strict control of test item configuration, 
environmental conditions, and test procedures. Qualification 
Test Reports shall be prepared to document test results. See 
Table V for requirements to be verified by test. 
4.2.3 Acceptance. Acceptance inspection, tests, and analyses or 
combination thereof, will be performed on flight production items 
and qualification test items to assure that these items are 
manufactured and assembled to drawing and specification 
requirements. 
component, subsystem, and end item level to assure that these 
items are acceptable for the next higher assembly. 
Acceptance activities shall be performed at the 
4.2.3.1 Similarity. This paragraph is not applicable to this 
specification. 
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4.2.3.2 Analysis. See Table V for requirements to be verified 
by analysis. Analysis shall be used for acceptance whenever it 
can be determined that (a) rigorous and accurate analysis is 
possible, (b) analysis is more cost-effective than test, and (c) 
acceptance by inspection is not adequate. 
4.2.3.3 Inspection. See Table V for requirements to be verified 
by inspection. Inspection shall be used for acceptance 
verification of all physical requirements that can be 
independently verified. 
4.2.3.4 Demonstration. See Table V for requirements to be 
verified by demonstration. 
4.2.3.5 Test. See Table V for requirements to be verified by 
test. Acceptance tests shall be conducted to verify functional 
performance and satisfactory workmanship which cannot be verified 
through analysis or inspection techniques. The functional and/or 
environmental test levels shall not exceed normal operating 
limits. 
4.2.4 Integrated Systems. Verification of the integrated systems 
requirements shall be accomplished during the preflight checkout 
phase as specified in 4.2.5. 
4.2.5 Preflight Checkout. Preflight checkout shall include all 
post-delivery activities used to verify the readiness of the SRM 
for its intended use. Preflight checkout shall be used for 
verification only if other testing cannot satisfy test 
requirements. 
4.2.5.1 Similarity. This paragraph is not applicable to this 
specification. 
4.2.5.2 Analysis. See Table V for requirements to be verified 
by analysis. An engineering analysis meeting the requirements of 
4.2.1.2 shall be used for preflight checkout. 
4.2.5.3 Inspection. See Table V for requirements to be verified 
by inspection. 
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4.2.5.4 Demonstration. See Table V for requirements to be 
verified by demonstration. 
4.2.5.5 Test. See Table V for requirements to be verified by 
test. 
4.2.6 Flight. The flight operations phase of verification shall 
include : 
a. Analysis of maintainability, reliability and safety 
functions to support trend evaluations. 
b. Test of SRM performance under flight conditions to 
support design evaluation. 
4.2.6.1 Morton Thiokol Responsibilities. Morton Thiokol shall 
support the flight/mission operations by providing the following: 
a. Launch support and anomaly resolution. 
b. Analysis of test data. 
4.2.6.2 Flight Phase Requirements. This phase of the 
verification program shall provide data to determine the 
following: 
a. Adequacy of the SRM design under actual operating 
conditions. 
b. Adequacy of the refurbished equipment. 
c. Adequacy of the safety functions. 
4.2.7 Postflight. Postflight requirements shall be included as 
an integral part of the flight phase of verification (see 4.2.6). 
4.3 Verification Cross Reference Index. Each Section 3 
requirement shall be verified by the verification method and 
during the verification phase shown on Table V. 
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4.4 Test Support Requirements. 
4.4.1 Facilities and Equipment. Personnel, procedures, and 
safety requirements shall be verified prior to equipment/ 
facilities use. Adequacy of the facility/equipment shall be 
verified by operational readiness inspections ( O R I ) .  
4.4.1.1 Morton Thiokol Facilities. Except for those facilities 
required at the launch site to refurbish the stiffener rings and 
to prepare other components for return to the factory, Morton 
Thiokol shall provide the total facilities effort required to 
design, develop, manufacture, refurbish, and test the SRM or 
portions thereof during development and certification. Included 
are all Government-furnished facilities, installation of fixed 
equipment, and miscellaneous facilities support activities. 
Special Test Equipment (STE), Transportation Support Equipment 
(TSE), and integrated logistics support and test support shall be 
supplied by Morton Thiokol. 
4.4.1.2 Government Facilities - KSC and VAFB. The Government 
will provide the total facilities effort required to conduct 
complete SRM assembly, test, launch, flight, recovery, and partial 
refurbishment operations at the KSC and VAFB. 
4.4.1.3 Launch Site Activation and Operations Plans. Morton 
Thiokol shall support development, planning, analyses, and 
integration of all activities related to launch site operations. 
Included shall be support of preliminary operational test and 
checkout planning and analyses to identify launch site and Ground 
Support Equipment (GSE) operational plans, verification plans, 
test specifications and requirements, test and checkout plans and 
timelines, and procedures planning for test and checkout, 
handling, transportation, and maintenance. 
4.4.1.4 Common Support Equipment. Morton Thiokol shall recommend 
GSE and shall analyze specified and potential GSE requirements in 
the design of Support Equipment and Tooling (SECT) for commonality 
and design/cost impact. Incorporation of unique GSE design/ 
operational requirements in SE&T shall be approved by the NASA 
Pro j ect Engineer. 
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4.4.1.5 Support Equipment Certification. All support equipment 
shall undergo certification tests as a part of the configuration 
inspection. Certification testing shall include interface, 
functional, and qualification proof load on each item of support 
equipment. 
4.4.2 Articles. The articles defined herein are motors to 
support WTR and ETR flights. 
4.4.3 Software. The requirements and criteria applicable to 
documentation necessary to assure demonstration of the functional 
and operational integrity of the SRM are defined in the 
Information Requirements Document, DPD 400. 
4.4.4 Interfaces. Interface control shall be implemented through 
the interface requirements defined in Paragraph 3.6 of this 
specification. 
5.0 PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY 
5.1 General. The requirements specified herein shall govern the 
preparation for shipment and the transport of the SRM, its 
components, and support equipment to all contractor and Government 
facilities or test sites. 
5.2 Packaging, Handling, and Transportation. Packaging, 
handling, and transportation for shuttle system elements shall be 
in general accordance with NHB 6000.1 (as changed by Approved 
Deviation RDW0497, see 10.1) and MMI 1700.17, or as amended by the 
following subparagraphs. Procedures for packaging and packing of 
parts and equipment shall be in accordance with MIL-STD-794. Drop 
testing of loaded segments in their shipping containers shall not 
be required. 
5.2.1 Reusable Containers. Where analysis indicates 
desirability of using reusable containers, maximum practical 
utilization shall be made of standard off-the-shelf, low cost 
metal or plastic containers. 
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5.2.2 Monitoring Devices. MIL-1-26860 humidity indicators shall 
be installed in the container wall or flexible barrier wall of 
all Method I1 packages. Other instrumentation for monitoring or 
recording in-transit environments (e.g. shock, vibration, 
temperature, etc.) shall be utilized as required by specific 
component specifications. 
5.2.3 Packaging Data. Packaging data shall be provided in 
accordance with DPD 400. 
5.2.4 Packaging of Precision Clean Items. Items cleaned to 
precision cleanliness shall be protected in accordance with 
MIL-STD-1246 to assure maintenance of specified cleanliness 
levels. 
5.2.5 Packaging of Hazardous Materials. All hazardous material 
packaging shall comply, as applicable, with NHB 6000.1. 
5.2.6 Marking for Shipment. Interior and exterior containers 
shall be marked and labeled in accordance with MIL-STD-129, 
including precautionary markings necessary to ensure safe 
handling, transportation, and storage. For hazardous materials, 
markings shall also comply with the requirements of applicable 
freight tariffs, requirements of the Department of Transportation, 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Code of Federal Regulations. 
5.3 Packaging and Shipment of Pyrotechnics. The packaging and 
shipment of pyrotechnics shall conform to the provisions of the 
Space Shuttle Pyrotechnics Specification, JSC 08060. Pyrotechnic 
shipping containers shall be designed and constructed in 
accordance with JSC 08060 and in accordance with JSCM 8080, 
Standard 90, CFR 49, or AFM 71-4, depending on the mode of 
transportation. 
6.0 NOTES 
6.1 Supplemental Information. The following design terms and 
definitions shall be used in designing the SRM and complying with 
the Space Shuttle Vehicle requirements. 
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6.1.1 Design Terms and Definitions. 
a. Char. Char is defined as a physical state produced 
during the thermal decomposition of insulation 
materials. The interface separating the char from the 
parent material is referred to as the char line. 
method used to determine the depth of the char line in 
phenolic insulation materials involves the calculation 
of an effective char density. The char line is 
therefore defined as the location where the density of 
the parent or virgin material has changed such that the 
resulting char density is K greater than the totally 
charred material density as defined below for both 
carbon and silica materials. 
The 
Char density = K(Rho Sub V-Rho Sub R) + (Rho Sub R) 
Where: Rho Sub V = Virgin density 
Rho Sub R = Residue density 
K = 0.27 for carbon cloth phenolic 
= 0.02 for silica cloth phenolic 
b. Ignition Interval. Ignition interval is defined as the 
time interval from ignition command to the initiators 
in the S&A device to a point at which the headend 
chamber pressure has built up to 563.5 psia. 
c. Impulse. 
(1) Action Time Total Impulse. Action time total 
impulse is defined as the integrated thrust along 
the nozzle centerline over the action time. 
(2) Delivered Specific Impulse. The delivered specific 
impulse is defined as the total impulse along the 
nozzle centerline delivered during action time 
divided by the loaded propellant weight. Delivered 
specific impulse at plant site shall be 
extrapolated to specific impulse at vacuum 
conditions. 
( 3 )  Web Time Total Impulse. Web time total impulse is 
defined as the integrated thrust along the nozzle 
centerline over the web time. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
h. 
i. 
k. 
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Initial Sea Level Thrust. Initial sea level thrust is 
defined as the sea level thrust along the nozzle 
centerline at the beginning of action time and at 
standard sea level atmospheric conditions. 
Limit Load. The maximum load the structural components 
will experience during the operational cycle, including 
assembly, launch pad integration, flight, re-entry, 
water impact and recovery operations. 
Mass Fraction. The nominal propellant mass fraction 
Lambda p is determined by the following method: 
Lambda p = (W Sub p)/( (W Sub p) + (W Sub i)) 
Where: W Sub p = Loaded propellant weight 
W Sub i = Nominal inert SRM weight 
Maximum Head-End Chamber Pressure. 
chamber pressure is defined as the highest pressure 
achieved within the SRM chamber, as recorded at the 
head-end. 
The maximum headend 
MEOP. 
pressure, including the maximum pressure resulting from 
ignition overshoot, which will be experienced under 
specification conditions. 
MEOP is defined as the maximum expected operating 
Motor Centerline. Motor centerline is defined as that 
line connecting the centroid of the forward attach stub 
skirt for structural SRB/SRM interface and the centroid 
of the aft attach stub skirt for structural SRB/SRM 
interface. 
Post Acceptance. Post acceptance time is the total 
time from acceptance of the item by the Government to 
its use. This includes not only periods of storage, 
but also the time during assembly at the launch site 
and subsequent preparation for launch. 
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature. Propellant mean bulk 
temperature (PMBT) is defined as the arithmetic average 
of the temperature of all parts of the propellant. 
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1. Safe Life. A design criterion under which failure will 
not occur because of undetected flaws or damage during 
the specified service life of the vehicle; also, the 
period of time for which the integrity of the structure 
can be ensured in the expected operating environments. 
m. Time. 
(1) Action Time. Action time is defined as that 
interval of time which begins at a point at which 
the head-end chamber pressure has built up to a 
value of 563.5 psia and ends at a point at which 
the head-end chamber pressure has decayed to a 
value of 22.1 psia. 
( 2 )  Tail-Off Time. Tail-off time is defined as the 
time interval between the end of web time and the 
end of action time. This time interval is shown 
graphically in Figure 6 .  
(3) Web Time. Web time is defined as that interval of 
time which begins at a point on the pressure time 
trace at which the head-end chamber pressure has 
built up to a value of 563.5 psia, and ends at a 
point determined by geometric construction, using 
the tangent-bisector method. (For this definition, 
the construction will consist of the following 
steps: ) 
(a) Extend the general shape of the pressure time 
curve prior to and immediately after the 
beginning of tailoff. 
(b) Bisect the angle formed by these extensions. 
(c) Extend this bisector to intersect the pressure 
time trace. The time that corresponds to 
this intersection point is the end of web 
time. This time interval is shown graphically 
in Figure 6. 
n. Ultimate Factor of Safety. The factor by which the 
limit load is multiplied to obtain the ultimate load. 
The wall thickness used in the stress calculations for 
pressure vessels and for tension and shear critical 
structures will be the minimum thickness. Stress 
calculations for compression critical and stability 
critical structures will utilize the mean thickness or 
1.05 times the minimum thickness, whichever is less. 
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0. Ultimate Load. The product of the limit load multiplied 
by the ultimate factor of safety. 
p. Weight. 
(1) Burnout Weight. Burnout weight is defined as the total 
weight at the instant of propellant burnout. 
(2) Expendable Weight. Expendable weight is defined as the 
weight of those items that are expended from the SRM 
from the time beginning at SRM ignition to splashdown 
including propellant, insulation ablatives, liner 
ablatives, nozzle ablatives, igniter charge, igniter 
ablatives, and jettisoned nozzle components. The 
expendable weight is further broken down as follows: 
Weight Expended to Liftoff. That portion of the 
expendable weight expended during the time between 
SRM ignition and liftoff. 
Weight Expended During Action Time. That portion 
of the expendable weight expended during the time 
between liftoff and the instant when action time 
ends. 
Weight Expended to Separation. That portion of 
the expendable weight expended during the time 
between SRM ignition and the instant of SRM 
separation. 
Weight Expended During SRM Descent. That portion 
of the expendable weight expended during the time 
between the instant of SRM separation and the 
instant of SRM splashdown. 
( 3 )  Total Loaded Propellant Weight. The total loaded 
propellant weight is defined as all solid propellant 
weight in the rocket motor, including igniter system 
propellant. 
q* 
r. 
S.  
t. 
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Inert Weight. Inert weight includes: motor case with 
assembly provisions, internal insulation, liner, 
inhibitor, seals, nozzle assembly, complete systems 
tunnel (excluding cabling), operational flight 
instrumentation and attach provisions, paint, ignition 
systems excluding propellant, external insulation, 
nozzle plug, SRM assembly provisions, SRB/SRM forward 
and aft skirt assembly provisions, and joint external 
insulation. Development flight instrumentation is 
excluded. 
Tare Weight. Tare weight is the weight of all items 
weighed with the component or assembly being weighed 
which are not part of the component or assembly which 
were not "zeroed out1! on the weight measurement device 
prior to weighment. 
Total Preflight Weight. Total preflight weight is 
defined as the weight of the SRM on the launch pad 
immediately prior to ignition command. 
(a) Preflight Requirements Weight. Preflight 
requirements weight is the weight of all 
expendables used in preparation for liftoff. 
(b) Liftoff. Liftoff is defined as the instant when 
the instantaneous thrust-to-weight ratio (T/W) is 
1.0. (Equivalent to 1.9 million pounds of thrust 
at vacuum conditions for each SRM). 
Nominal. Nominal shall be the arithmetic average of 
appropriate static test and flight motor performance. 
A l l  motor performance will be adjusted to a +60° F PMBT 
and to a common target burn rate. 
Smoothed Data. The 320 samples per second measured 
pressure data is curve fit by a 5th order spline 
function which is then used to determine the maximum 
pressure rise rate value over any 10 millisecond 
interval. 
Multiple ply. Multiple insulation layup performed at 
Morton Thiokol, Inc. 
Differential tailoff time. Differential tailoff time 
is defined as the time interval beginning at the first 
SRM web time and ending at the last SRM action time. 
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u. Allowable Load. The maximum load which the structure 
can withstand without rupture or collapse. 
v. Proof Pressure. The pressure to which production 
pressure vessels are subjected to fulfill the acceptance 
requirements of the customer, in order to give evidence 
of satisfactory workmanship and material quality. 
Proof pressure is the product of maximum operating 
pressure, times the proof factor. 
w. Margin of Safety. The ratio of allowable load to 
ultimate load minus one. 
x. Cross Contamination. SRM plum impingement on other 
Space Shuttle elements. 
y. Material Affected Depth. The depth of the internal 
insulation material which has been visibly heat affected 
(decomposed) during motor operation. Depth is 
referenced to the initial, prefire insulation surface, 
and is obtained by removing the insulation char down to 
visibly unaffected virgin rubber. 
6.1.2. p) requirements. 
z. Verifiable. Capable of meeting verification (see 
aa. Redundancy. A redundant system is one which will 
sustain one failure of an assembly/component and still 
retain the capability of performing the intended 
function. 
ab. Minimum. Smallest acceptable value. 
ac. Debris. Debris is defined as "broken, scattered remains 
emanating from the exterior surface(s) of any element!'. 
6.1.2 Space Shuttle Design Terms and Definitions. 
a. Certification. Qualification tests, major ground tests, 
and other tests and analyses required to determine that 
the design of hardware from the component through the 
subsystem level meets requirements. 
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b. Critical Categories. 
Cateqorv Definition 
1 L o s s  of life or vehicle 
1R Loss of redundant life-essential 
components 
2 Loss of mission 
2R L o s s  of redundant mission-essential 
components 
3 All others 
c. Fail Operational/Flight Vehicle. Fail operational for 
the flight vehicle is defined as the ability to sustain 
a failure and retain full operational capability for 
safe mission continuation. 
d. Fail Safe/Flight Vehicle. Fail safe for the flight 
vehicle is defined as the ability to sustain a failure 
and retain the capability to successfully terminate the 
mission. 
e. Functional Path. A functional path is a serial set of 
one or more functional elements (e.g., LRUs) constrained 
by the following: 
It is either the only path capable of performing 
the given function, or it is the smallest set 
(shortest string) of serial elements for which 
identical or similar serial elements can be 
substantiated by automatic or manual control 
(onboard or via GSE) to perform the same function 
via a redundant path for fail safe or fail 
operational capability. 
The string may contain non-controllable 
redundancies within itself to assure a satisfactory 
mean time between failure for the string (e.g., 
redundant components within a LRU), but must not 
contain redundancies needed to provide failure 
operational or fail safe capabilities. 
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( 3 )  Any point along a path which support several 
l1downstreaml1 paths must constitute the termination 
point of the llupstrearn1l functional path and the 
starting point of the "downstreamv1 functional 
paths. 
f. Hazard. Hazard is defined as the presence of a 
potential risk situation caused by an unsafe act or 
condition. 
g. Interchangeability. An item which (1) possesses such 
functional and physical characteristics as to be 
equivalent in performance, reliability and 
maintainability, to another item of similar or identical 
purpose and (2) is capable of being exchanged for the 
other item (a) without selection for fit or performance 
and (b) without alteration of the items themselves or 
of adjoining items, except for adjustments, is defined 
as being interchangeable. 
h. Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) .  An item whose replacement 
constitutes the optimum organizational maintenance 
repair action for a higher indenture item. 
i. Operational Status. The condition of a functional path 
with regard to its capability to perform its intended 
function. 
j. Certification Tests. Those tests conducted as part of 
the certification program to demonstrate that design 
and performance requirements can be realized under 
specified conditions. 
k. Replaceability. An item which, if equivalent in 
performance, reliability and maintainability to another 
item of similar or identical purpose, but which may 
differ physically from the original item in that the 
installation of the replacement item could require 
operations such as drilling, reaming, cutting, filing, 
shimming, etc., in addition to the normal application 
and methods of attachment, is defined as being 
replaceable. 
1. Shuttle Vehicle Booster (SVB). The shuttle vehicle 
booster shall consist of two SRBs (see m.) which are a 
part of the flight vehicle. 
m. 
n. 
0. 
P* 
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Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) . One complete SRM (see n.) 
plus structure, recovery, thrust vector control, 
attachment/separation and electrical and instrumentation 
subsystems. 
Improved High Performance Solid Rocket Motor Lightweight 
(SRM). One lightweight segmented motor case; ignition 
system complete with electro-mechanical safe and arm 
device, initiators, and igniter; movable nozzle; liner; 
insulation; propellant; instrumentation and electrical 
brackets; and integration hardware. 
Standby Status. I'Standby Status1' is defined as ready 
for launch except main propellant fill, crew ingress 
and final system verification. 
Verification. The process of planning and implementing 
a program that determines that the shuttle system meets 
all design, performance, and safety requirements. The 
verification process includes the qualification, 
development testing, acceptance testing, preflight 
checkout and flight demonstration and analyses necessary 
to support the total verification program. 
6.2 Alternate Source Qualification. This paragraph is not 
applicable to this specification. 
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Figure 1. Geometric Thrust Vector 
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position up to f 8 deg and at any pressure from MEOP to 35 psia) 
A004898 
Figure 2. Dynamic Thrust Vector 
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Figure 5. Shipping Envelope Limitations 
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TABLE I 
SRM THRUST REQUIREMENTS 
(KLB, 625 PSIA, 60 DEG F) 
Vacuum Thrust, K LBF 
Lower 
Bound 
3380.5 
3375.6 
3379.5 
3396.8 
3438.5 
3474.5 
3488.5 
3501.3 
3513.9 
3526.6 
3536.3 
3538.7 
3537.1 
3536.9 
3639.4 
3542.7 
3546.7 
3551.7 
3552.7 
3533.0 
3470.6 
3405.5 
3345.3 
3288.4 
3237.9 
3192.8 
3150.6 
3110.3 
3071.0 
3033.0 
2996.1 
2960.3 
2924.5 
2888.8 
2855.7 
2824.5 
Nominal 
3485.0 
3480.0 
3484.1 
3501.9 
3544.8 
3582.0 
3596.4 
3609.6 
3622.5 
3635.7 
3645.7 
3648.1 
3646.5 
3646.3 
3648.9 
3652.3 
3656.4 
3661.5 
3662.5 
3642.3 
3577.9 
3510.8 
3448.8 
3390.1 
3338.1 
3291.5 
3248.1 
3206.4 
3166.0 
3126.8 
3088.8 
3051.8 
3014.9 
2978.1 
2944.0 
2911.9 
Upper 
Bound 
3589.6 
3584.4 
3588.6 
3606.9 
3651.2 
3689.4 
3704.3 
3717.9 
3731.2 
3744.8 
3755.0 
3757.6 
3755.9 
3755.7 
3758.4 
3761.8 
3766.1 
3771.4 
3772.4 
3751.5 
3685.3 
3616.1 
3552.2 
3491.8 
3438.2 
3390.3 
3345.5 
3302.6 
3261.0 
3220.6 
3181.5 
3143.4 
3105.4 
3067.5 
3032.3 
2999.2 
Time (sec) 
37.0 
38.0 
39.0 
40.0 
41.0 
42.0 
43.0 
44.0 
45.0 
46.0 
47.0 
48.0 
49.0 
50.0 
51.0 
52.0 
53.0 
54.0 
55.0 
56.0 
57.0 
58.0 
59.0 
60.0 
61.0 
62.0 
63.0 
64.0 
65.0 
66.0 
67.0 
68.0 
69.0 
70.0 
71.0 
72.0 
73.0 
74.0 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
SRM THRUST REQUIREMENTS 
(KLB, 625 PSIA, 60 DEG F) 
Vacuum Thrust, K LBF 
Lower 
Bound 
2793.6 
2764.5 
2738.5 
2716.1 
2696.4 
2677.3 
2659.9 
2640.8 
2620.4 
2591.7 
2562.6 
2553.6 
2557.9 
2568.2 
2581.6 
2595.0 
2607.5 
2620.0 
2633.1 
2646.3 
2658.2 
2667.6 
2677.7 
2689.3 
2698.3 
2707.9 
2716.0 
2724.3 
2732.9 
2736.6 
2740.9 
2745.1 
2748.6 
2750.5 
2747.1 
2730.3 
2696.3 
2663.7 
Nominal 
2880.1 
2850.0 
2823.2 
2800.1 
2779.7 
2760.1 
2742.2 
2722.5 
2701.4 
2671.8 
2641.8 
2632.6 
2637.0 
2647.6 
2661.5 
2675.2 
2688.1 
2701.0 
2714.5 
2728.1 
2740.4 
2750.1 
2760.6 
2772.4 
2781.6 
2791.7 
2800.1 
2808.6 
2817.4 
2821.3 
2825.7 
2830.0 
2833.6 
2835.6 
2832.1 
2814.7 
2779.7 
2746.1 
Upper 
Bound 
2966.5 
2935.5 
2907.9 
2884.1 
2863.1 
2842.9 
2824.5 
2804.2 
2782.5 
2752.0 
2721.1 
2711.5 
2716.1 
2727.0 
2741.3 
2755.5 
2768.8 
2782.0 
2795.9 
2809.9 
2822.6 
2832.6 
2843.4 
2855.6 
2865.2 
2875.5 
2884.0 
2892.8 
2902.0 
2905.9 
2910.5 
2914.9 
2918.6 
2920.7 
2917.1 
2899.1 
2863.1 
2828.5 
Time (sec) 
75.0 
76.0 
77.0 
78.0 
79.0 
80.0 
81.0 
82.0 
83.0 
84.0 
85.0 
86.0 
87.0 
88.0 
89.0 
90.0 
91.0 
92.0 
93.0 
94.0 
95.0 
96.0 
97.0 
98.0 
99.0 
100 * 0 
101.0 
102.0 
103.0 
104.0 
105.0 
106.0 
107.0 
108.0 
109.0 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
SRM THRUST REQUIREMENTS 
(KLB, 625 PSIA, 60 DEG F) 
Vacuum Thrust, K LBF 
Lower 
Bound 
2636.0 
2602.6 
2564.5 
2529.1 
2494.4 
2443.9 
2394.3 
2370.1 
2356.9 
2338.3 
2312.1 
2277.6 
2233.3 
2195.2 
2166.9 
2136.6 
2098.7 
2059.7 
2026.7 
1994.5 
1953.5 
1906.1 
1815.3 
1709.8 
1518.7 
1238.1 
957.5 
742.7 
582.2 
458.1 
353.4 
271.8 
196.0 
136.1 
90.5 
Nominal 
2717.6 
2683.0 
2643.8 
2607.3 
2571.5 
2519.5 
2468.3 
2443.4 
2429.8 
2410.6 
2383.6 
2348.0 
2302.3 
2263.1 
2233.9 
2202.7 
2163.6 
2123.4 
2089.4 
2056.2 
2103.9 
1965.1 
1923.6 
1897.3 
1872.1 
1815.2 
1713.4 
1534.2 
1265.0 
988.4 
771.8 
608.1 
482.0 
372.1 
293.1 
Upper 
Bound 
2799.1 
2763.5 
2723.1 
2685.5 
2648.7 
2595.1 
2542.4 
2516.7 
2502.7 
2482.9 
2455.1 
2418.4 
2371.4 
2331.0 
2300.9 
2268.8 
2228.5 
2187.1 
2152.1 
2117.9 
2074.3 
2024.0 
1981.4 
1954.2 
1928.2 
1909.6 
1895.0 
1871.1 
1815.3 
1716.7 
1547.7 
1290.3 
1017.5 
799.2 
634.3 
Time (secl 
110.0 
111.0 
112.0 
113.0 
114.0 
115.0 
116.0 
117.0 
118.0 
119.0 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
SRM THRUST REQUIREMENTS 
(KLB, 625 PSIA, 60 DEG F) 
Vacuum Thrust, K LBF 
Lower Upper 
Bound Nominal Bound 
60.6 216.7 505.6 
37.3 155.6 395.6 
21.7 103.7 313.7 
70.9 238.3 
44.7 173.8 
27.3 119.8 
82.9 
54.8 
34.4 
21.0 
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TABLE I11 
MAXIMUM SRM THRUST IMBALANCE FOR MATCHED PAIRS 
DURING IGNITION, STEADY STATE, AND TAILOFF 
Maximum SRM Isnition Transient 
Ignition Transient 
Time, sec. 
0 
0.1 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1.0 
Ignition Transient 
Thrust Imbalance, lbf 
0 
300,000 
300,000 
200,000 
200,000 
85,000 
Maximum SRM Steadv State Thrust Differential 
Time 
Maximum Thrust 
Imbalance, lbf 2/ 
1.0 second to end of steady state IJ 85,000 
lJ End of steady state is defined as 4 . 5  seconds before earliest 
web time. 
2J Maximum thrust imbalance is defined as the maximum difference 
in average thrust of the left and right SRM's over any four- 
second time span contained within the steady state operation. 
Thrust imbalance increases linearly from 85,000 to 268,000 lbf 
during the time interval between the end of steady state and the 
beginning of tailoff. 
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TABLE I11 (Contld) 
TAILOFF THRUST IMBALANCE 
Differential 
Tailoff Time, % 3J 
0 
Maximum Vacuum 
Thrust Differential 
Durins Tailoff, lbf 4J 
268,000 
10 570,000 
20 670,000 
30 710,000 
40 
50 
580,000 
470,000 
60 370,000 
70 290,000 
80 220,000 
90 160,000 
100 100,000 
1/ Differential tailoff time is defined in Section 6.0 
4J Thrust imbalance impulse during the differential tailoff 
period must be 5 4,500,000 lbf-sec 
COMPONENT 
1. Case cylindrical segments 
2. Case forward segments 
3 .  Case aft segments 
4 .  Case aft closures 
5. Case stiffener rings 
6. Case clevis joint pins 
7. Nozzle metal parts 
8. Nozzle flex seal reinforcement 
shims and end mounting rings 
9. Nozzle flex seal assy 
(elastomer material) 
10. Nozzle boss attach bolts 
11. S&A device 
12. Igniter chamber 
13. Igniter adapter 
14. Chamber pressure transducers 
15. Igniter port special bolts 
(for mounting chamber 
pressure monitoring OPTS) 
NUMBER REUSES 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
9 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
5 
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TABLE IV 
REUSABILITY GOALS 
I Section 3.0 
I Performance/ 
I Design Requirement 
I Reference 
I I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
I 3.1 Definition 
I 
I 3.1.1 General 
I Description 
I 
I 3.1.2 Missions 
I 
I 3.1.3 Operational 
I Concepts 
I 
I 3.1.3.1 Assembly 
I Operations Concept 
I 
I 3.1.3.2 Launch Pad 
I Operations Concept 
I 
I 3.1.3.3 Booster 
I Operations Concept 
I 
I 3.1.3.4 Recovery 
I Concepts 
I 
I 3.1.3.4.1 Refur- 
I bishment Concepts 
I 
I 3.1.4 
I Organizational and 
I Management 
I Relationships 
I 
X I  
X I  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 3 .1 .5  Systems 1 x 1  I I 
I Engineering I l l 1  
1 Requirements I l l 1  
I I I I I  
1 List I I I I  
I I I I I  
1 3 .1 .7  Critical 1 x 1  I I 
I Components I I I I  
I I I I I  
I 3 .2  Characteristics1 X I I I 
I I I I I  
I 3 . 2 . 1  Performance I X I I 1 
I 3 .1 .6  Government I X I I I 
I Furnished Property I I 1 I 
I I 
I Altitude I 
I I 
I I 
I Thermal I 
I I 
I I 
I 
I 3 . 2 . 1 . 1  General 
I Performance 
I 
I 3 . 2 . 1 . 1 . 1  Ignition 
I Characteristics 
I 
I 3 . 2 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1  
I Ignition Interval 
I 
I 
2 1 2  
I 
I 
2 / 5  I 2 / 5  
I 
I 
I l l  
X I  
I 
I 
1 5  
I 
I 
1 5  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I  
I I  
I I  
I I  
I 1  
I I  
I I  
I I  
I I  
I I  
I I  
I I  
I I  
I I  
I I  
1 5 1  
I I  
I I  
1 5 1  
I I  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 5  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 4 .2 .1 .2 ,  4 .2 .2 .2 ,  
1 4 .2 .6  
I 4 .2 .1 .2 ,  4 . 2 . 1 . 5 ,  
I 4 .2 .2 .2 ,  4 . 2 . 2 . 5 ,  
4 .2 .6  
4 .2 .1 .5 ,  4 .2 .2 .5 ,  
4 .2 .6  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
TABLE V 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
3.2.1.1.1.2 1 1 5 1 5 1  I 
I I I I I  
3.2.1.1.2 Motor 1 x 1  I I I 
Characteristics I I I I I  
Pressure Rise Rate I I I I I 
I 
3.2.1.1.2.1 Nominal1 
Thrust-Time Curve I 
3.2.1.1.2.2 I 
Performance I 
Tolerances and I 
Limits I 
I 
Differential I 
I 
Seals I 
I 
a. Redundant I 
I 
3.2.1.1.2.3 Thrust I 
3.2.1.2 Pressure I X 
I I  
2/5 
2 
3/5 
2/5 
2 
3/5 
I I  
5 
I I 4.2.1.5, 4.2.2.5 
I I  
I I  
I I  
I I  
I I 4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.5, 
I I  
I I 4.2.6 
2/51 i 4.2.1.2, 4.2.2.2, 
I I 4.2.6 
I I  
I 
I 
2/5 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 3  
I 
4.2.6 
4.2.1.3, 4.2.1.5, 
4.2.2.3, 4.2.2.5, 
I I I I I 4.2.3.5, 4.2.7 
1 1 1 1 1 1 I I  
b. Deflections I I 2 I 2 1 I I 1 I 4.2.1.2, 4.2.2.2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
c. Zero leakage I 2/5 2/5 
I l l  
1 5 1  1 3  
I l l  
I l l  
I l l  
4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.5, 
4.2.5.5, 4.2.7 
4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.5, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
VERIFICATION METHOD : VERIFICATION PHASE: I 
1. Similarity A. Development I 
2. Analysis B. Certification I 
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APPENDIX B. COMPOSITE MOTOR CASE 
B.l INTRODUCTION 
This section presents the design concepts fo r  the Block I1 SRM case using high- 
performance, fiber-reinforced composite materials. Fiber-reinforced composite 
pressure vessels are  significantly lighter than their all metal counterparts. 
This makes them particularly attractive for  rocket motor case design because 
large payload improvements are  possible. Trade studies were conducted with the 
following considerations: (1) meet the  composite case design requirements per 
CPW1-3400 specification, (2) enhance reliability, (3) reduce cost, and  (4) 
increase performance. The design concepts presented build upon the foundation 
established by the fi lament wound case (FWC) development program. Simplified 
design concepts have been developed to correct problems encountered with the FWC 
design, and  take ful l  advantage of "lessons learned." 
B.2 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has found that composite motor cases offer  significant perform- 
ance improvements over the HPM steel case design. Payload increases in  excess of 
10,000 lb  can be achieved with segmented composite cases which a re  less complex 
and more reliable than the current F W C  design. 
Composite motor cases have two major disadvantages: (1) the high cost 
compared to steel and  (2) the reliability has not been demonstrated in a fl ight 
program. Reuse and  refurbishment are required to make composite cases cost 
competitive with steel cases. Initial studies indicate that reuse is technically 
feasible, but a significant development program is required to  develop insulator 
removal techniques and  to prove that a used case is structurally sound. Issues 
surrounding the composite case susceptibility to impact damage must be resolved. 
Microencapsulated indicators could resolve the issue of hidden impact damage. 
B-1 
The major findings of the Block I1 composite material t rade study are  
summarized below: 
1. Use of high-strength, high-modulus carbon fibers such as Amoco's T-40 
could result in  a 10,000 lb  payload increase over the HPM segmented 
case design. 
2. The current axial  growth requirement drives the case design resulting 
in 25 percent increased membrane weight. A single shock absorber a t  
the forward ET attach could allow a n  optimum pressure vessel design, 
resulting in substantial savings in inert weight. 
3. A composite/steel hybrid design has many attractive features, but would 
also require a shock absorber a t  the forward ET  attach to handle a 6-  
in. axial growth. 
4. New simplified designs have the potential of solving FWC development 
problems while lowering cost and increasing reliability. 
5 .  Prepreg materials could potentially solve delamination and quality 
problems associated with the wet-wind process used for  FWC. The  low 
variation of the prepreg materials increases the case reliability, and 
prepreg should be cost competitive when purchased in high volume. 
6.  Simple innovative joint concepts have been developed which eliminate 
rotation of the seal, eliminate eccentric loading, and  are  lighter and  
lower cost than the FWC joints. 
7. A two-step insulation process could enhance the reliability of the 
insulation seal, but a t  a significant cost increase. 
8. Reuse could reduce case acquisition costs by a factor of seven, but 
technology development and demonstration a re  required. (NASA/Langley 
coupon data  indicate impact damage that is not visible can cause 30 
percent reduction in  case membrane strength. A full-scale test is 
planned in FY 87 to resolve FWC impact issues.) 
9. Composite cases a re  inherently as reliable as metal cases, but the 
reliability has not been demonstrated in a flight test program. 
The  development of reliable, high-performance composite cases is possible. 
Composite case reliability can be quantified by calculating the probability of 
events leading to a failure. Structural tests, static firings, analysis, NDT, 
acceptance tests, and quality control are  employed to enhance reliability. 
However, almost every fai lure  of a new design is caused by an  "unknown" factor, 
Le., the forward joint failure of the first  FWC test article (TFSl),  and  the 
compressive transition/joint failure of STA-2A. Thus, a new design may be 99.9 
B-2 
percent reliable in theory, and  fail  during the test because of an unknown 
factor. New designs are  less reliable than existing designs, simply because they 
do not have demonstrated reliability. Static test programs which simulate worst- 
on-worst flight conditions are necessary to develop confidence, and  a statis- 
tically significant database to demonstrate reliability. 
In conclusion, all existing data indicate that a reusable, reliable 
composite case is technically achievable, but a comprehensive large development 
and demonstration program is required. 
B.3 STUDY OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH 
The primary objective of this study is to develop composite case designs 
with enhanced reliability; secondary objectives are  to optimize cost per pound of 
payload to orbit and  to improve performance. Specific objectives are to develop 
simplified design concepts which eliminate design deficiencies of the FWC (cut 
helicals for  example), and to identify materials and  processes which could 
resolve FWC laminate delamination problems. 
The  overall approach is to conduct material and design trade studies and 
identify those candidates which best meet the objectives. Because the FWC has 
strict axial growth and axial stiffness requirements, only high modulus carbon 
f iber  material systems need to be considered. Lower cost materials such as S-2 
glass and  Kevlar can only be considered in hybrid carbon f iber  applications. 
Classical Laminated Plate theory was extensively 
ply orientation needed to simultaneously meet strength, growth, and stiffness 
requirements. Finite element modeling techniques were used to evaluate joint 
seal rotation for selected design concepts. 
used to determine the optimum 
The baseline case design requirements are presented in Table B-1. The  axial 
growth requirement drives the case design and weight. The growth and stiffness 
requirements are almost exclusive: low helical wrap angles are  required for  high 
stiffness, and high helical wrap angles a re  needed for low axial growth. The 
result is a laminate which is not optimized for  strength or stiffness; the axial 
growth requirement adds over 25 percent to the membrane weight. 
B-3 
Trade studies were conducted for  designs with high axial growth in order to 
significantly increase performance. These design concepts would require develop- 
ment of a shock absorber a t  the forward ET  attach point to preclude overloading 
the external tank and payloads. 
Table B-1. Block I1 S R M  Composite Case Design Requirements 
Axial Growth* 
Radial Growth 
Axial Stiffness 
Pressure 
Thrust 
Joint Line Load 
Compression Load 
Factor of Safety 
Reuse 
0.72 in. 
0.66 in. (forward segment only) 
2.63 x lo6 lb/in. (spring constant) 
1,004 psi (1,100 psi for  heads-up) 
3.35 x lo6 (3.7 x lo6 lb for  heads-up) 
37,500 lb/in. 
27,200 lb/in. 
1.4 
Metal parts 19 reuses 
*Current axial  growth requirement is conservative relative to 0.91-inch 
projected +3 sigma value for  the steel SRM. 
B.3.1 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
The Block 11 SRM composite case is designed to be compliant with CPWI-3400. Each 
composite segment design is optimized in three regions: the membrane region, the 
joint region, and the transition region between the membrane and  the joint 
region. The  membrane region is optimized to meet strength, axial  growth, radial 
growth, and  axial stiffness requirements listed in  Table B-1. The  joint region 
design is optimized to balance net tension, shear out, and  bearing failure modes 
with the axial loading defined in Table B-1. 
The  seals connecting the composite case segments use the following design 
guidelines: 
0 O-rings must have 15 percent minimum squeeze when assembled and  a t  least 10 
percent squeeze when compression set is considered. 
O-rings must have a t  least 0.002-in. clearance to prohibit contact with both 
side walls. 
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B.3.2 
Seal must maintain contact with the gland even a t  twice the expected 
displacement or twice the expected displacement rate. 
Seals must meet requirements for a temperature range of 20° to 120°F 
Seals must not be damaged during joint assembly. 
Seals must be verified a f te r  assembly by a leak check. 
Seal performance must not be jeopardized by the joint corrosion prevention 
system or  the seal lubricant. 
HEADS-UP MISSION DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
The concept of launching the Space Shuttle in an  orbiter up  position is being 
studied by NASA and Rockwell. The current launch mode has the orbiter on the 
underside of the external tank during ascent. The heads-up concept would 
decrease orbiter loads and  increase the payload to orbit. The  optimum SRM 
performance in this heads-up mode would require a 0.392 in./sec burn rate a t  625 
psia and  60°F (10 percent higher MEOP). Analysis predicts a 3,500-lb payload 
increase over the baseline case design (see Reference B-2). The  motor cases for  
the Block I1 are  evaluated for  heads-up fl ight a t  1,100 psig with a thrust of 3.7 
x lo6 lbf. 
A detailed analysis was conducted to assess design changes required to 
upgrade the FWC for  the 10 percent higher MEOP required fo r  the heads-up 
mission. This study found that composite cases are readily adaptable to design 
changes, and  simple addition of two hoop plies would allow the composite cases to 
maintain a 1.4 factor of safety. Results of this study, including a n  assessment 
of the metal part  margins, are  presented in References B-1 and  B-2. 
B.3.3 FWC DESIGN DESCRIPTION 
When considering improved design concepts for  Block 11, experience with the Space 
Shuttle FWC-SRM provides a valuable baseline. As shown in Figure B-1, the 146- 
in.-diameter FWC-SRM consists of seven major structural components: two steel 
domes, a steel ET  attach segment, and  four graphite/epoxy composite segments. 
The  composite segments are  fabricated by wet filament winding Hercules AS-4 
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graphite fibers and HBRF-55A epoxy resin. In addition, the joint regions have 
AS-4 unidirectional broadgoods preimpregnated with 3501 epoxy resin. The 
composite segments a re  joined with pinned steel tang and clevis adapter rings 
(Figure B-2). Each composite segment is divided into three regions: the 
membrane region, the joint region, and  the transition region between the membrane 
and joint regions. The  membrane region laminate, designed to meet strength, 
axial growth, radial  growth, and axial stiffness requirements (Table B-I), 
consists of & 33.5-deg helical layers (1-in.-thick) interspersed with 90-deg hoop 
layers (0.32-in. thick). The joint region, designed fo r  net tension and  shear- 
out strength, consists of helical and hoop layers interspersed with 0-deg 
broadgood layers. In  the transition region, three helical layers f rom the 
membrane a re  terminated (called "cut helicals"), and  48 0-deg broadgood layers 
are  added for  the joint. 
The  FWC joint design is shown in Figure B-2. A simple tang and  clevis 
adapter configuration was selected for  all FWC joints. The  baseline FWC joint 
was designed to be compatible with the existing SRM steel components; thus, the 
interfaces with the SRM components are geometrically fixed. As a result, the 
joint must have a radial offset to allow fo r  the thicker composite shell. Pin 
connections were chosen joints, and blind holes were used for  all pinholes. 
Throughout the FWC development program, many design and  process problems 
were encountered, all of which were successfully resolved. However, several non- 
optimum design features remain which should be eliminated in a new Block I1 
composite case design, such as: 
a. During the evolution of the F W C  design, three helical ply terminations (cut 
helicals) were required to simultaneously meet joint thickness and  strength- 
plus-membrane axial growth requirements. These cut helicals a re  diff icul t  
to fabricate, diff icul t  to analyze, and  impose high discontinuity stresses. 
A delamination associated with the cut helicals ultimately led to the 
premature fai lure  of the FWC structural test article STA-2. Cut  helicals 
should be eliminated in the new case design. 
b. T h e  0-deg broadgood reinforcements terminate in the transition region in 
such a manner as to impose high stress concentrations. The  resulting low 
compression strength was a major contributor to the fai lure  of STA-2. A new 
case design should taper the ply terminations to  reduce the stress concen- 
trations and  increase compressive strength. 
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The FWC was designed with an  eccentrically loaded joint to meet interface 
requirements of existing metal hardware. The eccentric load results in non- 
optimum joint strength and  imposes a three-dimensional stress state which is 
very difficult  to  analyze. The  eccentric load path also causes the joint 
seal to  rotate, resulting in a gap opening a t  the primary O-ring. A new 
case design should minimize load eccentricity and eliminate seal rotation. 
The  FWC development program was plagued with delaminations caused by the 
short out-life, wet-wind resin, poor resin content control, and  other 
factors (Section B.7). A new Block I1 case should incorporate a new 
materials system to eliminate delaminations. 
The  existing FWC field joint seal design will not meet the requirements 
presented in  Section B.3.1. The  hardware design needs to be modified to 
reduce joint gap opening and increase O-ring squeeze. 
The  FWC design incorporated O-ring seals between the metal adapter rings and  
composite case (Figure B-2). Manufacture of a defect-free seal surface on 
the composite case was very labor intensive and  costly. This particular 
design feature  did little to enhance the reliability of the case and should 
be eliminated. 
COMPOSITE CASE REUSE 
Development of case reuse capability is essential for  the cost-effective use of 
composite case SRMs. Reuse as shown in Figure B-3 can reduce case acquisition 
costs by a factor of seven. 
Initial studies indicate that case reuse is feasible. Subscale and  ful l  
scale data  show no  case strength degradation over multiple pressure, temperature, 
and  salt water exposure cycles. Adapter ring redrilling operation has shown the 
flexibility of r ing reuse, and  moderate success has been achieved in hydrolasing 
rubber f rom inside FWC segments with no composite damage. 
The  major concerns on composite case reuse center on critical damage 
detection and  evaluation. NDT techniques are  needed to detect internal, non- 
visible damage to  the composite inflicted by impacts. Extensive work on low- 
velocity impacts (Ref. B-4) has shown extensive internal damage may occur with 
nonvisible external indications. Current methods rely on hydroproof tests and  
acoustic emission response to detect structural damage. Ultrasonic inspection 
techniques detect delamination and flaw growth. An NDT technique has yet to be 
demonstrated that  can detect and  assess visible and  nonvisible damage. Once the 
damage issue is resolved, case reuse can be reliable and cost effective. 
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An extensive damage tolerance investigation program is planned for  FWC in F Y  
1987. This program will include impact tests on subscale laminates, quarter-  
scale bottles, and a full-scale Damage Tolerance Test Article. This program 
should answer all open questions concerning the susceptibility of large composite 
motor cases to low-level impact damage. 
Because nonvisible damage is a major concern, an  outer coating will be 
needed to witness the impact event. Work is currently in progress a t  Southwest 
Research Institute on coatings with microcapsule indicators which burst and  
release a dye a t  a selected impact energy (Reference B-5). This type of coating 
could indicate the impact event location and  energy level. 
B.4 BLOCK I1 S R M  COMPOSITE CASE DESIGN 
The  preferred Block I1 SRM composite case design is presented in Figure B-4. The 
design concept is built upon the foundation established by the FWC development 
program, and  incorporates features which eliminate several design weaknesses. 
The  146-in.-diameter composite motor consists of seven major structural  compo- 
nents: two steel domes, a steel ET attach segment, and  four  graphite/epoxy 
composite segments. The  metal parts are fabricated from high-strength T250 
steel. The  composite segments a re  fabricated from T-40 carbon fibers preimpreg- 
nated with ERL 1908 epoxy resin. The design uses a simplified double-strap joint 
concept, and  incorporates yokes to mate with the composite on the domes and  ET  
at tach segments. The current steel case weighs about 98,000 lb, while the 
existing FWC weighs about 70,000 lb. It is estimated that the Block I1 composite 
case would weigh 52,000 lb. 
B.4.1 COMPOSITE CONFIGURATION AND LAYUP 
The composite case design was divided into three regions for  each segment in 
order to achieve the design requirements with a minimum weight configuration. 
The  three regions are  the joint region, the membrane region, and  the transition 
region from the joint region to the membrane (Figure B-5). Each segment (for- 
ward, center, a f t )  was designed to i ts  respective MEOP to gain fur ther  weight 
savings. 
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The membrane design is optimized to meet the axial  growth, axial  stiffness, 
radial growth, and  pressure strength requirements. The choice of T-40 fiber/1908 
prepreg is based on trade studies presented in Section B.7. This material system 
results in a 30 percent reduction in case membrane weight, and  eliminates 
delamination problems associated with the FWC wet-wind system. The  optimum 
helical angle is 30 deg. 
The  joint laminate design is similar to  the FWC design, except that  the 0- 
deg reinforcements a re  uniformly dispersed to reduce stress concentrations. The 
FWC joint had a mixture of 3501 prepreg and  HBRF-55A wet-wind resin systems. The 
Block I1 design uses a single-resin system throughout, reducing the delamination 
potential. 
The  joint design is optimized to carry the design loads without bearing, net 
tension, or  shear-out failure. 
The  transition region is significantly improved over the FWC design. The 
cut helicals are eliminated, and the O-deg ply terminations a re  tapered to reduce 
discontinuity stresses. the design also includes hoop plies dispersed through 
the laminate which results in a joint with zero rotation (Section B.4.2). 
B.4.2 COMPOSITE JOINT AND SEAL DESIGN 
Based on trade studies presented in Section B.6, a double steel strap concept 
(Figure B.6) is used as the joint on the segmented composite case. This joint 
consists of two steel straps, one located on the case inside diameter and the 
other on the outside diameter. A two-row pin pattern was selected for  the 
composite-to-ring interfaces. The two rows are staggered with each row having 
132 equally spaced pins. The joint sealing mechanism consists of three O-rings. 
Two are  placed on the clevis end and  one is located in the capture feature. The 
capture feature limits the movement of the clevis O-rings while the capture 
feature seal closes as a function of pressure. The double strap joint does not 
impose the stiff metal-to-metal interfaces associated with a typical tang clevis 
joint. With this joint flexibility plus high transition hoop stiffness, joint 
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rotation is eliminated. Development testing on a 92-in.-diameter segmented 
composite case (Figure B.7) showed zero joint rotation with a 36,830-lb/in. line 
load. A comparison between a typical FWC type tang and clevis joint and a double 
steep strap is presented in Section B.6. 
The  fundamental seal design is identical to that used for  the redesigned 
SRM, and meets all requirements listed in Section B.3.1. There are  two key 
differences, however: (1) the joint tends to close, not open, and  (2) the seal 
is away from the primary load path which reduces the axial motion and  seal 
distortion. 
The  baseline FWC design has O-rings between the metal adapter rings and 
composite case. This design is labor intensive, and  does little to enhance the 
composite case seal reliability. A better concept, shown in Figure B.6, is to 
use a two-step insulation process. A thin bladder could be vulcanized to the 
case. The case would be hydroproofed, verifying the seal integrity. Next, a 
standard insulator would be vulcanized over the bladder. This concept would 
assure that insulation erosion during motor burn would not reveal an unknown leak 
path or "worm hole." 
B.4.3 BLOCK I1 COMPOSITE CASE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
A 2-D f ini te  element model of the Block I1 composite redesign joint was construc- 
ted using ANSYS Revision 4.2. The modeling technique was the same as that used 
for  the SRM capture feature analysis addressed in Reference B-6. The model 
consists of an axisymmetric composite tang with membrane, steel joint ring, 
capture feature, plane stress pins, and gap friction interfaces. The model is 
based on minimum geometry and uses geometric parameters so as to easily modify 
the joint, when necessary. Only half of the joint was modeled taking advantage 
of symmetry. 
Figure B.8 shows the finite element grid and boundary conditions of the 
hybrid joint model. The  model consists of axisymmetric 2-D isoparametric solid 
(stiff 42) elements, with the pins modeled with plane stress elements. 
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The addition of integrally wound hoop layers forward of the capture featurc 
adds significant hoop stiffness to  this joint. As a result, joint rotation is 
minimal and the sealing surface is allowed to close. As shown in Figure B.9, the 
radial  displacement remains almost constant for approximately 20 in. f rom the 
lowermost point of the model. The maximum radial displacement is 0.766 in. a t  
the  outermost end of the membrane. 
The  maximum critical stresses of the steel rings and capture feature, along 
with their locations, a re  shown in Figure B.lO. Note that the stresses within 
the  capture feature  and around the seal grooves are  significantly lower than the 
maximum stresses. Table B-2 is a listing of key stresses, their allowables, and  
appropriate factors of safety. 
B.4.4 BLOCK I1 COMPOSITE CASE DESIGN SUMMARY 
The Block I1 composite case design has been configured to: (1 )  meet the design 
requirements per CPWI-3400, (2) enhance reliability, (3) reduce cost, and 
(4) increase performance. Compared to the HPM steel case design, the Block I1 
composite case is almost 50 percent lighter. Thc Elock !I coiiipositc case l iscs 
"lessons learned" from the FWC development program: 
a. Cut  helical layers of FWC joint region, which led to the failure in compres- 
sion of the first  full-scale structural test article, are eliminated. 
b. High-stress concentrations at  joint reinforcement terminations a re  reduced 
by smoothing the transition region between the joint and  the membrane. 
c. Joint eccentricity and  rotation are eliminated. This results in an  optimum 
stress state in the pin joints and  assures no opening of gap a t  O-ring seal. 
d. A long out-of-life prepreg resin is used in order to prevent the delamina- 
tion problems of FWC, which were caused by staging of the resin during t h e  
winding process and poor resin content control. 
Double steel ring joint eliminates complex and expensive machining requircd 
for  metal adapter rings. 
e. 
f. A two-stage insulator design is employed to enhance the composite case seal 
reliability. O-rings between the metal adapter and  composite case are  
eliminated. 
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CF MAX VON 
67 KSI 
CF MAX BENDING 
25 KSI 
MAX HOOP 
119 KSI - 
138 KSI 
MAX VON MISES 
128 KSI 
Figure B-10. Location of Maximum C r i t i c a l  S t r e s s e s  i n  
Metal Strap Components 
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B.5 HYBRID METAL/COMPOSITE CASE 
This section presents a design concept which uses a metal liner overwrapped with 
composite hoop plies. The metal liner is designed to serve as a gas barrier and 
carry the axial loads in the motor case. The hoop plies carry the hoop loads, 
and eliminate the O-ring seal joint rotation. The case would weigh about 63,000 
lb. This concept has large (6411.) axial growth, and would require modification 
of the forward ET attach point. 
B.5.1 DESIGN DESCRIPTION 
For a metal-lined composite motor case the joints are an integral part of the 
0.225-in.-thick seamless T-250 steel forging (Figure B.11). The joints consist 
of a simple tang and  clevis with pinned connections. The  metal joint uses the 
three O-ring capture feature concept. The design would provide for an interfer- 
ence f i t  with the two clevis O-rings, which reduces the rotation of the clevis 0- 
rings. All joint rotation is eliminated by a hoop-stiffened region close to the 
joint. This hoop overwrap region alters the shell deformation, thus eliminating 
bendiilg in  the joint. All bending is abscrbed by the ccmposite which results in 
a joint f ree  f rom eccentric loads. With an equal load distribution through the 
joint, the propensity for  joint rotation or opening is nonexistent. The metal 
shell is sized to  transfer the axial loads. The 0.40-in.-thick T40/982 graphite 
epoxy hoop plies are  sized to restrain the radial expansion and  carry the hoop 
loads. The composite hoop sizing is determined by the allowable strain of the T- 
250 steel liner; hence, the composite is used primarily for  its high stiffness 
characteristics. 
Thermal strain differences between the composite and  metal liner must be 
compensated for  by either: (1) bonding the composite to the metal liner or (2) 
allowing the overwrap to slide relative to the liner. This would require an 
extensive analysis to fully understand the tractions caused by frictional and  
tangential sliding of the overwrap relative to the liner. A third concept 
considers the placement of a rubber shear ply between the composite and metal 
interfaces to compensate for  the strain and expansion difference during both cure 
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and motor pressurization. this would also serve as a barrier to protect the case 
f rom galvanic corrosion. The use of T-250 steel would allow the design to 
include a welded factory joint for  minimum weight. 
B.5.2 HYBRID CASE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
The hybrid metal/composite case was analyzed with a TASS axisymmetric f ini te  
element model. The  model was of sufficient fidelity to evaluate the stresses in 
the composite, rubber, and  metal components. The case was analyzed in a closed 
vessel configuration with a n  internal pressure of 1,100 psig. The  f ini te  element 
model is shown in Figures B-12 and B-13. 
T h e  f ini te  element analysis predicts maximum fiber stresses of 230 ksi in 
the case membrane region. Peak fiber stresses of 155 ksi a re  computed for  the 
hoop-stiffened region. The  allowable fiber stress for  the 42-msi T-40 fiber is 
625 ksi. The  low fiber stress indicates the composite design is stiffness, not 
strength critical. The composite was sized to contain the radial  expansion of 
the T-250 steel. The  peak stresses in the metal case occur near the edge of the 
hoop=stXfened region. The  177 ksi stress is a resu!t of the axial line loads 
plus the bending imposed due  to  the hoop stiffness variance in  the region. Key 
stresses and  locations a re  depicted on Figures B-12 and B-13. 
B.5.3 AXIAL GROWTH AND STIFFNESS 
The case specification limits the total motor axial growth to 0.72 in. under MEOP 
conditions. This axial growth requirement is imposed to limit the loads induced 
in the  ET and orbiter. Total axial growth of the hybrid metal (composite) case 
is about 6 inches. This would require modification to the E T  attach points to 
compensate for  the increase in growth. A simple shock absorber a t  the forward ET 
attach would preclude overloading the ET and orbiter. 
The  case specification requires a minimum bending/axial stiffness of 2.63 x 
lo6 lb/in. when expressed as a n  axial spring constant. This may also be 
expressed as average axial modulus times thickness (E,. t). T h e  average axial 
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modulus times thfckn'ess value of the FWC is 8.13 x lo6 lb/in., while the axial 
modulus times thickness value of the hybrid case is 7.1 x 10 
case optimization is required to show compliance to the case stiffness 
requirement. 
6 Ib/inch. Further 
B.5.4 HYBRID CASE REUSE 
Reuse is essential for  the cost-effective use of composite motor cases. Reuse of 
a composite case could reduce the acquisition costs by a factor of seven. 
Refurbishment of postfired filament wound cases has had limited success in the 
reuse of the composite shell, while rework of the metal hardware has been 
extremely successful. 
With a metal liner, the current techniques of using a hydrolaser to remove 
the charred insulation could be incorporated. This would prepare the steel liner 
for new insulation. Postfired motor segments would go through extensive NDT 
evaluations; if the composite overwrap was suspect, the same hydrolaser cleaning 
technique could be employed to remove the existing composite and prepare the 
surface f o r  new hoop plies. 
B.6 JOINT TRADE STUDIES 
Two joint concepts were evaluated for  connecting the composite segments a t  the 
field joints. These concepts are  compared in Figure B-14, and involve a simple 
steel strap design and a standard FWC type tang and clevis adapter design. These 
design concepts are discussed in detail as follows. 
B.6.1 DOUBLE STEEL STRAP JOINT 
A double steel strap concept is used as the baseline joint on the segmented 
composite case. This joint consists of two steel straps: one located on the case 
inside diameter and the other on the outside diameter. This concept was 
discussed in detail in Section B.4.2. 
The joint sealing mechanism consists of three O-rings. Two are  placed on 
the clevis end and  one is located in the capture feature. The capture feature  
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limits the movement of the clevis O-rings, while the capture feature  seal closes 
as a function of pressure. The  double strap joint does not impose the st iff  
metal-to-metal interfaces associated with a typical tang clevis joint. with this 
joint flexibility, joint rotation is eliminated. Development testing on a 92- 
in.-diameter segmented composite case showed zero joint rotation. 
B.6.2 TANG AND CLEVIS JOINT 
The tang and  clevis joint on the baseline FWC is designed to be compatible with 
existing SRM components. This required a joint with a radial  offset  to attach to 
SRM domes, attach segments, and handling equipment. This radial offset  causes an 
unequal load distribution through the joint and  contributes to joint rotation. 
The  eccentric loads and  bending discontinuities imposed by the flexural differ-  
ences between the composite case and joint result in joint rotation. 
T o  eliminate this deleterious behavior, the Block I1 tang and  clevis adapter 
rings (Figure B-15) are  centered on the composite tang to create a line of action 
through the center of the joint. The addition of local hoop reinforcements in 
the joint areas has eliminated the rotation in  the joint. The  change in radial 
growth of the joint and  basic case occurs outside of the joint area. 
T h e  Block I1 composite adapter rings consist of a capture feature  tang that 
creates a n  interference f i t  when assembled with the clevis. This interference 
f i t  minimizes joint rotation on the clevis seals and  the capture feature  seal 
actually increases in compression as a function of chamber pressure and  thrust. 
T h e  metal-to-metal joint or field joint is connected by one-hundred seventy-seven 
1-in.-diameter pins made of MP35N. Three alignment slots are  used as guides for  
assembly. 
B.7 MATERIALS AND PROCESS TRADE STUDY 
T h e  objective of this task was to select optimum materials and  processes for  
high-quality laminate, high-performance large SRM cases. In considering the 
materials and processes for  fabricating large motor cases, experience with the 
Space Shuttle SRM-FWC is valuable. To simultaneously meet the FWC strength, 
stiffness, and growth requirements, specific tensile strength is the design 
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driver for  the hoop fiber and specific tensile modulus is the design driver for  
the helical fibers. Advanced carbon fibers such as Amoco T-40, Hitco Hitex 
46-8, and Hercules IM7 offer  significant improvements in both strength and  
modulus over the AS-4 f iber  currently used. Hybrid fiber combination (Kevlar and 
S-2 glass hoops with graphite helicals) may of fer  performance/cost advantages not 
possible with the single material. 
The  high strength-to-weight ratios of Kevlar are  attractive, but the low 
compressive and transverse strength of aramid fibers could not tolerate the 
handling, transportation, or Shuttle prelaunch compressive loads. The high 
radial case expansion of a booster fabricated with S-2 glass results in high 
stresses in  the web region of the propellant. This stress level in  the propel- 
lant may cause cracks to develop which severely affect  motor performance. High- 
modulus graphite fibers a r e  required to provide the strength and  stiffness needed 
to meet the CPW1-3400 specifications. 
B.7.1 TRADE STUDY WITH/WITHOUT AXIAL GROWTH REQUIREMENTS 
Controlling axial growth, bending/axial stiffness, and radial growth in a rocket 
booster is extremely important to ensure proper performance of the Space Shuttle. 
Excessive axial elongation induces undue stress in the ET and  orbiter. T h e  
bending/axial stiffness must be controlled to ensure dynamic stability, limit on- 
pad excursions, and prevent excessive loads from being imparted into the Shut- 
tle’s structural components. T h e  radial growth in the star region of the forward 
propellant grain must be contained within a n  allowable limit to  prevent the 
propellant from exceeding its strain capability. 
The  initial composite case concepts presented in Table B-3 incorporate axial 
growth a n d  bending/axial stiffness as key parameters in the case design. Several 
hybrid case designs use a combination of fibers to maximize performance and  
minimize cost. Meeting the axial growth requirements severely limits the 
efficient use of composites. A 20 to 25 percent membrane weight penalty is 
required to  achieve maximum upper 3-sigma growth of 0.72-inch. A series of case 
designs using the current bending/axial stiffness requirements and  extending the 
axial growth to 3 in. is presented in Table B-4. 
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The tables show that high-strength, high-modulus carbon fibers (T-40) result 
in the greatest performance increase and the greatest material cost. The lowest 
material cost is the AS-4 wet-wind system currently used for  FWC. As discussed 
in the following section, prepreg materials have been selected to eliminate 
laminate quality problems associated with the wet-wind process. I t  is antici- 
pated that the new high-performance material systems will be cost competitive 
when purchased in large volume. Therefore, T-40 carbon fiber is selected as the 
material for the Block I1 case design. 
B.7.2 COMPOSITE MATERIAL AVAILABILITY 
The production of a composite case would require a large amount of graphite 
material. The production capacity of graphite fiber exceeds current demand. The 
cost of the high-strength, high-stiffness prepreg fiber is currently high. But, 
forecasts show that with high production rates, there will be a significant cost 
reduction. A summary of the candidate graphite fibers is listed below: 
Material Availabilitv Performance 
T-40 Good High 
T500 Good Moderate 
X-AS Good High variability 
IM-6 Good High variability 
Hitex 46-8B Near production High 
AS-4 Excellent Moderate 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Low 
B.7.3 WET WINDING VERSUS PREPREG 
HBRF-55A epoxy resin is used for wet winding the hoop and helical layers of the 
FWC. The short gel time of the resin is not optimum for the current FWC winding 
process, which leads to high void content and delaminations. Most of these 
problems are related to the 20 to 30 days required for winding the 30-ft long, 
1.3-in.-thick cylinders. The resin content variability is inherent in the 
current wet filament winding process. The HBRF-55A resin is not suitable for the 
prepreg broadgoods and unidirectional joint reinforcement tapes, and the use of 
the 3501 resin in these area necessitated a 350°F cure temperature. This cure 
B-35 
temperature causes a considerable reduction in the resin elongation of the HBRF- 
55A which was designed for  a 250°F cure, and  complicates the thermal stresses. A 
fur ther  complication is the difference in Tg of the two resin systems. On 
cooldown, the 3501 resin (having a higher Tg) develops properties before the 
HBRF-55A, and the thermal stresses are  relieved by deformation and/or  delamina- 
tions in the composite layers containing the HBRF-55A. The  short gel time of the 
HBRF-55A eliminates resin flow in  the case during cure, and  the mandrel expanding 
against the gelled composite is thought to introduce resin fractures which do not 
heal during cure. The  potential effect  on off-axis properties is important to 
the current design using the +33-deg helicals. 
Many of the drawbacks of the current FWC material system could be overcome 
through the use of a prepreg resin such as Fiberite 982 or Narmco 52432, for  both 
the case winding and the reinforcing broadgoods. Although this prepreg resin 
would solve the problems of short potlife, early gel, and resin content varia- 
tion, the current belt compaction system may not be adequate. This would require 
the use of a n  in-process compaction, similar to the one used on the composite 
overwrap* which resulted in a laminate with less than 1 percent voids and a 64 
percent f iber volume. 
Many of the critical loads imposed on a n  SRM require high shear and  compres- 
sion strengths. The  low void content (1 percent) of a prepreg composite delivers 
the high strengths necessary to withstand prelaunch, splashdown, and  handling 
loads. Table B-5 presents a comparison of FWC and advanced Block I1 material 
technology. 
Higher fiber design strengths are possible with prepreg fibers due  to the 
low COV. Tests (Table B-6) with AS-4 HBRF-55A had a COV of 6.1 percent while 
that  of T-40/ERL 1908 prepreg is 1.9 percent. A significantly higher design 
allowable is possible with a prepreg because the minus three-sigma design value 
is higher for  systems with low statistical variations. 
*T-40/998 material is used on the SRM redesign composite overwrap which is 
1.9 in. thick, 9 in. wide, and 12 f t  in diameter. The r ib  reverses the SRM 
joint rotation and  causes the seal to close. 
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Table B-6. 
AS-4/HBRF-55A 
Wet Wind 
[36-in.-dia.l 
N = 18 
X = 552 ksi 
COV = 6.1% 
Fiber Strength Variation Study 
T-40/ERL 1908 T-40/ERL 1908 
Prepreg Prepreg 
[ 18-in.-dia.1 (46-in.-dia.1 
N = 31 N = 2  
X = 730 ksi 667 ksi 
cov = 1.9% 668 ksi 
Prepreg composites offer  enhanced reliability and quality over wet winding. 
The cost of prepreg composite is currently high when compared to a wet-wind 
material system. The overall cost of the case may be about the same, because of 
lower fabrication and quality control concerns with a prepreg system. 
The  demonstrated reliability of a wet-wind system is evidenced on the C-4 
program. Several C-4 wet-wind cases were rejected (failed) in a hydroproof 
acceptance test (First Stage, 1 of 46; Second Stage, 5 of 55;  Third Stage, 8 of 
50 burst below the minimum requirement). With a low-strength variation, the 
material is more predictable, hence, reliability increases. 
Prepreg also offers reduced safety hazards in the fi lament winding area by 
reducing exposure to carcinogenic chemicals (MDA and NMA) and  carbon fiber dust. 
In  summary, prepreg material costs are  high, but significant price reduc- 
tions a re  possible with high volumes. The  overall case cost may be lower with 
prepreg. The cost issue is complex and a detailed cost benefit study must be 
conducted. The advantages of a prepreg system are  summarized below: 
0 Lower manufacturing cost 
0 Higher performance 
0 Lower quality control costs 
0 Lower scrap/reject costs 
0 Higher reliability 
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